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ABSTRACT 
Organizational research shows how mismatches between organizational design 
characteristics and contingency factors lead to lower performance. In addition to classic 
contingency factors, knowledge is a powerful resource that influences performance. This 
research explores knowledge as a structural contingency factor for interorganizational 
systems. It explores the performance effects of different types of knowledge (i.e., tacit and 
explicit) interacting with organizational coordination mechanisms (e.g., direct 
supervision and mutual adjustment) in the highly complex environment of crisis events 
(e.g., natural disasters) where multiple organizations often rapidly develop reciprocal 
interdependencies. In those events, teams of boundary spanners often work to coordinate 
the interorganizational response; hence, understanding how performance is affected by 
the interaction of knowledge types available and various coordination mechanisms is 
useful to managers. 
Using a mixed methodology design, this research extends structural contingency 
theory to the interorganizational level. First, immersive qualitative field research is 
conducted to observe widely dispersed organizations during a developing crisis. Those 
observations help formulate a baseline agent-based computational organizational model. 
Using that baseline, theoretically driven changes are made to create unique models that 
populate each quadrant of a two factorial experiment design. A Monte Carlo simulation 
of each model generates performance effects (e.g., speed and project risk) of different 
types of coordination mechanisms interacting with different types of knowledge.  
This research shows that a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism is most fit 
when teams are made up of people with a high level of tacit knowledge. During a crisis or 
disaster response situation, however, managers may not have much control over the type 
of knowledge available within the boundary spanning teams. This research also shows 
some interesting interaction effects across the different performance variables; hence, 
managers faced with reciprocal interdependencies should apprise themselves of the 
knowledge types associated with interacting boundary spanning teams. 
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“Basic to the theory of organizations is the premise that all organizations need 
coordination.  Coordination means integrating or linking together different parts of an 
organization to accomplish a collective set of tasks” (Van De Ven, Delbecq & Koenig 
1976).  This research employs a contingency theoretic lens to investigate the influence 
that group knowledge level has on the ability of independent organizations to coordinate 
mutually beneficial activities.  This is a multi-method, meso-level organizational study 
that looks at the performance of boundary spanning groups employing the different 
coordination mechanisms of direct supervision and mutual adjustment.  
A. CONTEXT 
Large-scale disasters are significant events that tend to rapidly create a great deal 
of human suffering; major hurricanes and earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and 
man-made disasters such as the terrorist attacks of 9–11 are examples of disaster 
phenomena.  In the aftermath of these events and in some cases immediately prior to an 
event such as a hurricane, many diverse organizations act in response.  Those 
organizations generally include governmental departments and agencies (e.g., local, state 
and federal), military forces, non-governmental organizations (e.g., relief agencies), 
businesses, and similar organizations from the international community.  Often, these 
organizations have similar functions (e.g., providing medical assistance) and rapid 
deployment capabilities.  These organizations generally share a broad, common goal—
they want to relieve human suffering.  They also face a common, highly complex 
environment.  Many of these early responding organizations have a high degree of 
expertise and experience both in getting to and operating autonomously in a disaster area.  
Even with that degree of experience and common guiding goal, these organizations often 
face a host of challenges to putting their capabilities to use in a timely manner—and 
timely response is essential in mitigating many problems in the aftermath of a disaster.  
Some of those challenges include lack of familiarity with the local environment, novel 
problems created by the disaster, and inefficient interorganizational coordination (Wright 
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1976; Tierney 1985).  With those particular challenges in mind, the theoretical 
frameworks brought to bear in this dissertation are discussed. 
B. ORGANIZATION DESIGN THEORY 
Organization research and the studies of disasters and disaster management found 
common ground in the 1960s with the emergence of interest in open system models for 
the study of organizations.  Open system models promoted consideration of the effects of 
the external environment on an organization (Scott 2003).  The external environment 
included such things as resources outside the control of an organization, other 
organizations, and the effects of environmental exigencies (Rogers & Whetten 1982).  
The development of the open systems models paved the way for the study of 
relationships between different organizations, and those relationships were highly 
applicable to the study of organizations that respond to a disaster.   
One of the well-accepted open system models of organizations is the contingency 
model (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967).  The contingency model is a rational systems 
perspective: components of an organization (e.g., its people and technology) are 
purposefully arranged to efficiently attain goals (Scott 2003).  The contingency theory of 
organization design is based on the idea that while there are general forms (i.e., structural 
arrangements) that can be recognized in any organization, there is no one best way to 
organize to efficiently attain goals (Galbraith 1977; Donaldson 2001; Scott 2003).  
Instead, efficient attainment of goals is based on the fit between internal arrangements of 
organizational components and the demands of the environment (Donaldson 2001; Scott 
2003).   
An organization is defined as a socially constructed structure of people, processes, 
and material resources whose purpose is the efficient attainment of its goals (Blau & 
Scott 1962; Etzioni 1964; Leavitt et al. 1974; Mintzberg 1983).  Organization is critical to 
enabling the efficient attainment of a firm’s goals—so critical that organization theorists 
conceptualize it as central to the long-term success of the firm (Burns & Stalker 1961; 
Burton & Obel 2004; Child 1973).  Indeed, over many decades, organizational research 
shows that mismatches between organizational design characteristics and well-
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understood contingency factors (e.g., task uncertainty and interdependence) lead to lower 
performance and potentially to an organization’s obsolescence (for a review of 
Contingency Theory, see Donaldson 2001).  Hence, understanding relevant contingency 
factors is critical to an organization’s leadership for its role in managing structural 
adaptation, especially the type of adaptation that looms in the face of a crisis like a 
disaster event. 
While classic contingency factors (e.g., size and task interdependence, for a 
review, see Donaldson 2001) and design responses (e.g., centralization and coordination 
mechanisms, for a review, see Daft 1998), are well understood, the emergence of the idea 
that knowledge can be viewed as a critical organizational resource (Drucker 1995, Grant 
1996b; Nonaka 1995; von Krogh 1998) is prompting more attention in organization 
design research (Burton & Obel 1998).  Research into the phenomenon of knowledge, 
particularly knowledge management, is gaining momentum in the broad field of 
Information Science (Alavi & Leidner 2001; Croasdell et al. 2003); however, 
organization design research that focuses on knowledge as a contingency factor remains 
sparse; for groundbreaking research into the idea that knowledge is an organization 
design contingency factor, see Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal (2001), Birkinshaw, 
Nobel & Ridderstrale (2002), and Ibrahim & Nissen (2006).  
C. KNOWLEDGE FLOW THEORY 
Knowledge in this context comes from the tacit and explicit construct articulated 
by Polanyi (1966).  Tacit knowledge is the personal know-how and mental models 
developed through experiences.  More importantly, it is tacit knowledge that, when 
combined with other resources (e.g., humans and machinery), enables action (e.g., 
producing products).  A common characteristic of tacit knowledge is that it is not easily 
transferred from one place or person to another.  Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, 
is articulated knowledge (e.g., formalized written procedures) that are easily stored and 
transferred.1  A key aspect of explicit knowledge is that it cannot completely capture all  
 
                                                 
1 Other taxonomic ideations regarding knowledge are discussed later in this work. 
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that is known tacitly.  Nonaka (1995) theorizes that knowledge, especially tacit 
knowledge, is a powerful resource that firms use and create to positively affect 
performance. 
Knowledge management and organizational learning theories suggest that there 
should be a purposeful balance between exploration and exploitation tasks—i.e., those 
tasks that contribute directly to knowledge creation and work respectively (March 1991, 
Nissen 2006).  The dynamic theory of knowledge creation contends that organizational 
performance and long term competitive advantage can benefit as a result of improved 
knowledge flows throughout a firm, especially flows of tacit knowledge (Nissen 2006).  
The processes by which those flows occur are identified as socialization, externalization, 
combination, and internalization (Nonaka 1995; Nissen 2006).  Knowledge creation and 
learning is conceptualized as a spiral sequence of flow through those four processes.  If 
this sequence is not promoted, then knowledge tends to become isolated in distinct areas 
of a firm, i.e., it “clumps.”  Tacit knowledge is especially susceptible to clumping due to 
its nature of being highly personal and difficult to articulate.  Tacit knowledge also can be 
thought of as having high viscosity (i.e., being “sticky”): it does not flow easily (von 
Hippel 1994; Nonaka 1995; Nissen 2006).  Hence, it behooves managers to understand 
how organizational structures promote or inhibit knowledge flow. 
D. INTERORGANIZATION KNOWLEDGE FLOW 
Drawing on the idea that knowledge enables action, knowledge management and 
interorganizational knowledge flow are significant areas for research in disaster or crisis 
response situations that are marked by intense resource and time constraints (Chou 2007).  
In these situations, both knowledge exploitation and knowledge exploration are critical.  
There is generally a surplus of work for every responding organization; therefore, 
expertise resident within an organization is generally heavily exploited early in the 
response to enable immediate actions that begin to achieve the organization’s goals.  
Additionally, the environment that these organizations interact with is marked by many 
novel conditions that require new combinations of actions and innovative use of available 
resources (i.e., knowledge exploration) to enable efficient responses and further 
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attainment of those goals.  From an open systems perspective, knowledge is a resource 
that is available, not only within the firm, but from the environment as well—especially 
from other organizations.  This makes knowledge research paradigms an apropos lens 
through which to investigate interorganizational performance issues in the aftermath of 
disasters and crisis events (Chua, Kaynak & Foo 2007; Chua 2007).  
Some organization research has highlighted the idea that organizations tend to 
prefer autonomy, especially in crisis situations (Levine & White 1961; Tierney 1985).  
This contributes to an insular approach to planning; in other words, planners responsible 
for charting an organization’s course in the face of a crisis tend to look at the 
environment as if they are the only service provider (Dynes & Quarantelli 1976; Tierney 
1985).  This single-provider perspective is not a realistic condition in crisis events: 
generally, myriad organizations with varying degrees of skills and local knowledge 
converge in response to a crisis (Dynes & Quarantelli 1976; Neal & Phillips 1995; Chua 
2007; Chua, Kaynak & Foo 2007; Becerra-Fernandez et al. 2008).  Often an organization 
finds itself dealing with a host of other organizations that it may not have previous 
experience working with on a regular basis (Dynes & Quarantelli 1976; Tierney 1985; 
Becerra-Fernandez et al. 2008).  Confusion and disagreement are prevalent byproducts of 
this lack of familiarity and often unclear interorganizational lines of authority 
(Quarantelli 1988; Suparamaniam & Dekker 2003).  Tierney (1985) concluded that the 
main barriers to interorganizational effectiveness in crisis response were insufficient 
organization, education, and levels of awareness.  To overcome those barriers, 
organizations must “…learn about themselves and disaster behavior…plan together and 
with other relevant community groups, and…give high priority to coordination of effort.” 
(Tierney 1985 p. 83) 
1. Interorganizational Coordination 
Most researchers in the area of interorganizational studies have qualitatively 
looked at the antecedents of achieving interorganizational coordination (Whetten & 
Aldrich 1979; Rogers & Mulford 1982; Smith, Carroll & Ashford 1995; Kenis & Knoke 
2002; Suparamaniam & Dekker 2003).  Some have postulated that traditional 
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contingency factors (e.g., task uncertainty and task interdependence) applicable to 
organization design (i.e., intraorganization design) provide a sound explanation regarding 
the type of coordination mechanisms (e.g., organic or mutual adjustment rather than 
bureaucratic or hierarchy with its direct supervision) that would exhibit the best fit for the 
temporary interorganizational structures that emerge when multiple organizations agree 
to start working together (Mulford & Rogers 1982; Ishida & Ohta 2001; Wright 1976).  
Others have proposed that hierarchical responses are the best mechanism for coordination 
in crisis response situations (Bigley & Roberts 2001; Moynihan 2006 and 2008; Gonzalez 
2008).  This dissertation research is undertaken to provide new insights into this debate. 
It has been observed that cooperation and coordination between organizations 
have been an increasing organizational trend (Baker & Faulkner 2002).  Just as there are 
a variety of ways to organize to achieve a firm’s goals, there are multitudes of structural 
ways to facilitate interorganizational coordination to enable goal achievement (Smith, 
Carroll & Ashford 1995; Van de Ven & Walker 1984).  Just as complex organizational 
structures (e.g., the matrix form) marked by lateral relationships and informal or weak 
ties (Granovetter 1973) have grown in popularity over the past decade (Scott 2003), 
networked or alliance interorganizational forms are appearing frequently in industry 
(Baker & Faulkner 2002; Scott 2003).  Those forms appear to capitalize on the strength 
of loose coupling and weak ties—ties that are facilitated by the ubiquity of Internet and 
other communications channels (Kenis & Knoke 2002).  Contingency theorists stress that 
these popular forms are no organization performance panacea, and recommend that 
organization managers look at structural aspects of their firm and various contingency 
factors (e.g., elements of their external environment or task interdependencies) to see if 
they are in fit (see Donaldson 2001; Burton & Obel 2004). 
In the governmental sector, stalwart bureaucracies frequently are affected by 
various contingencies, especially when performance requires coordinated activities with 
other governmental organizations, both national and international.  Points of friction are 
likely to emerge as these bureaucratic forms interact with each other while attempting to 
achieve related goals.  Scholarly research (see Nissen, Jansen, Jones & Thomas 2004; 
Nissen 2005) and high profile reviews, such as the 9–11 Commission, reveal the friction 
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that exists between and within bureaucracies and their difficulty in achieving goals in 
complex situations.  Those studies show that key performance goals of those 
organizations were not successful, even with the availability of critical knowledge and 
ubiquity of communications technology.  Increasing the layers of bureaucracy and 
changing information processing rules—like the actions taken to reorganize the U.S. 
National Intelligence community—are certainly alternative structures worthy of 
consideration, but these again are no panacea, especially when dealing with independent 
international partners.  Achieving cooperative relationships between different 
organizations reflect the concept of an interorganizational system.   
2. Interorganizational Systems 
Interorganizational systems are defined as “planned and intentionally formed 
cooperative ventures between otherwise independent agents.” (Kumar & van Dissel 
1996) They are becoming more prevalent today largely because they can share costs, 
spread risk, and access complementary resources, especially knowledge, to help them 
succeed in the face of growing environmental complexity (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman 
1996).  While more firms are making the strategic decision to cooperate with other 
organizations, researchers have left unattended the mechanisms for how the practitioners 
should be organized to efficiently attain the desired goals.  Practitioners, here, are those 
who have to generate the dynamic information flows between the partnering 
organizations (Schermerhorn 1979).  Those people are referred to in organization 
literature as boundary spanners (Mintzberg 1979; Thompson 1967). 
Interorganizational systems can include a variety of independent organizations 
that take on some role in a developing structure among the organizations.  Often, 
deliberate planning and time are required for these organizations to become effective at 
achieving their interorganizational goals (Inkpen & Li 1999).  There are, however, 
instances where time is not a luxury, such as during a crisis (e.g., natural disaster).  
Creating interorganizational action among government agencies in these extreme events 
often entails forming an entity that would resemble a joint venture (i.e., the resource 
contributions from two or more organizations that go to form a new organization that gets 
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its goals from the parent firms, see Daft 1998).  It can be argued that because those joint 
ventures emanated from bureaucratically structured organizations they tend to be likewise 
structured—i.e., that due to the strong acculturation process in many governmental 
organizations, familiarity with known structures were favored over the consideration of 
contingency factors and the concept of fit (Comfort 1985).  While research has been done 
on knowledge flows in extreme organizations (see Nissen, Jansen, Jones & Thomas 2004; 
Nissen 2005), this research adds to the understanding of knowledge flows and 
organization design issues at the interorganizational level of analysis.   
In either deliberate or crisis situations, forming interorganizational systems 
requires that some agents from each organization become involved in initiating the 
necessary structures (e.g., roles and processes) to achieve satisfactory interorganizational 
performance.  Those initially involved agents fit the definition of a boundary spanner 
unit: an organizational unit that interfaces with the external environment (Mintzberg 
1979; Thompson 1967).  Early boundary spanning activity is postulated as critical to 
achieving the goals that drive the formation of an interorganization system 
(Schermerhorn 1979).  Smith, Carroll and Ashford (1995) cited the need to provide 
managers insights into how to manage work teams operating in the challenging 
environment of interorganizational alliances. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This dissertation applies a contingency theoretic approach to investigating an 
important interorganizational performance issue.  It expands the idea that knowledge is 
not only a critical resource, but also a contingency factor to be considered in organization 
design.  It expands the understanding of performance implications of coordination 
mechanisms operating among boundary spanners during interorganizational system 
formation.  And, this research provides further evidence of the efficacy of knowledge 
management research into the area of disaster response operations.  The specific research 
question addressed in this dissertation is: 
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What are the organizational performance effects of different types of knowledge 
(i.e., tacit and explicit) interacting with organization design coordination mechanisms 
(e.g., direct supervision and mutual adjustment)?   
F. RESEARCH APPROACH 
This contingency theory research entails comparing organizational performance 
data resulting from the combination of different types of knowledge interacting with 
different types of coordination mechanisms.  This kind of research lends itself to a two-
by-two factorial design (Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002).  Table 1 depicts the two-by-
two factorial design where tacit and explicit types of knowledge are juxtaposed with 
direct supervision and mutual adjustment coordination mechanisms to provide a 
framework for comparing performance data.  There are, however, significant challenges 
of conducting contingency theory research on an interorganizational system emerging in 
response to a crisis event.  Foremost among these challenges are the infrequent, 
unanticipated nature of crisis events and the highly unique nature of each event and the 
responding organizations.  To ameliorate these challenges, this research uses a mixed 
methodology research approach (Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998; Kerlinger & Lee 2000; 
Mingers 2001). 
 
Table 1. Factorial design 
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This mixed approach uses a combination of computational organization modeling 
(Levitt, Cohen, Kunz, Nass, Christiansen & Jin 1994) and participant observation 
(Spradley 1980).  The qualitative participant observation phase focuses on collection of 
multiple sources of data to set the stage for triangulation:  combining evidence from 
multiple sources to deepen confidence in explanations developed of organization science 
phenomenon, as well as to generate future research areas where the data shows 
incongruence (Burton 2003).  Participant observation in a field research setting is 
conducted by observing networks of independent military headquarters as they 
simultaneously respond to the same crisis event.  New knowledge is generated by 
observing how each boundary spanning team, in this case each headquarters’ planning 
team, works to coordinate initial response actions with the other headquarters.  Detailed 
observations of team structures, knowledge flows, and planning and coordination 
processes are used to develop an empirically grounded baseline computational model of 
the interorganizational system.  From that model and informed by organization and 
knowledge flow theory, computational experimentation is conducted.  The experiment 
consists of adjusting select model parameters and holding all other parameters constant, 
and then multiple simulation runs using Monte Carlo techniques are conducted to 
generate the data to support statistical analysis of this factorial design experiment (Burton 
& Obel 1995; Carley 2002; Nissen & Buettner 2004). 
1. Multi-Method Research 
This research builds on a continuing stream of research that employs 
computational organizational models that are grounded in organization theory (e.g., 
Galbraith 1974; Mintzberg 1979) to conduct computational experimentation (e.g., Nissen 
& Buettner 2004, Nissen 2005, and Looney & Nissen 2006).  The results of those 
experiments allow for the analysis of a variety of organization forms, especially ones that 
are rare and temporary.  The computational modeling tool used in this research comes 
from more than two decades of work in the Virtual Design Team (VDT) Research 
Program (VDT 2005).  It is based on upon Galbraith’s (1974) theory that organizations 
are information processing systems (Cohen 1992).  An extension of this extensively 
validated agent-based model, the POW-ER application, is used in this research. 
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2. Field Research Structure 
The research documented in this dissertation was conducted within the auspices 
of a large-scale multinational maritime field experiment.  To investigate an 
interorganizational phenomenon during a crisis, a team of planners from six distinct, non-
collocated, and co-equal maritime organizations (i.e., no two organizations had a 
superior-subordinate relationship in actuality or implied by military rank of its 
commander) were available to conduct a pilot study over a ten day period.   
To generate the interorganizational dynamics that would ground the development 
of the computational model, the teams of planners were divided into two groups, each 
having three planning teams.  Each group represented a federation, specifically a 
coalition: a federation formed by mutual agreement to cooperate and coordinate behavior 
(Warren 1967; Provan 1983).  Each group was given a three day mock international crisis 
scenario based on a complex type of operation other than war (e.g., humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief situation) along with similar objectives (i.e., common goals) and 
the common task to “coordinate” planning efforts and each team’s individual plan with 
the other teams within the group.  By virtue of the scenario, objectives and common task, 
the planning teams became boundary spanning units for their independent organizations.  
On the surface, these independent organizations with reciprocal interdependencies 
may appear to be an atypical structure to a person familiar with the more traditional 
military command and control response to crises—i.e., the joint/coalition task force.  
Traditionally, a task force is commanded by an agreed upon leader and populated with 
personnel, equipment and/or logistics from each of the contributing organizations.  From 
organization theory, this would be consistent with the creation of a divisional structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) to handle the increased information processing demands of the crisis 
environment (March & Simon 1958; Galbraith 1974).  Drawing on Mintzberg’s (1979) 
“five basic parts” of organizations, the perceived drawback to this approach is that while 
elements of the operating core are immediately available to respond, it takes time for the 




to support the leader at the strategic apex.  The delay can be partially attributable to 
travel time and the developmental time required for these organizational parts to coalesce 
into a high performing whole (Tuckman 1965). 
While each organization’s strategic apex and available operating core units are 
overwhelmed with decision making and work tasks respectively, the boundary spanning 
units perform planning (e.g., the act of developing alternative courses of action to solve a 
problem—see Cyert & March 1992, and Simon 1997).  In this field environment, each 
boundary spanning unit had between 7 and 17 people participate in the scenario.  The 
participants operated from their office buildings.  Since these office buildings were not 
located in the same cities, the participants used Internet-based and telephone 
communications channels to exchange information.  Passive participant observers 
(Spradley 1980) were assigned to each unit to monitor and make a record of both internal 
unit activities and inter-unit activities.  Relevant data from these observations are used to 
develop a grounded baseline computational model of this interorganizational 
phenomenon.   
G. ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
In Chapter II, a literature review is conducted to cover the theoretic foundations 
that underpin this research, including organization design, structural contingency theory, 
knowledge dynamics, interorganizational coordination, disaster response research, and 
computational organization theory.  In Chapter III, the research design is articulated.  In 
Chapter IV, the analysis of the data is presented.  Chapter V concludes this dissertation 
with a summary of the findings, discussion of limitations, and suggested future research.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents a review of the structural contingency theory and the 
knowledge flow theory literatures regarding organization design and points to some 
unanswered questions regarding contingency factors and their affect on organization 
performance at the interorganizational level.  The focus here is on interorganizational 
response at the early stages of a crisis or disaster event where virtual organizations may 
emerge.  The chapter also includes a section on computational organization theory as it 
represents an effective means for investigating many organizational issues, especially 
when experimentation with real world organizations is costly or the opportunities are 
fleeting, such as in disaster response activities. 
A. ORGANIZATION RESEARCH 
Prior to the 1960s, organization research generally focused on the internal 
elements of an organization—i.e., it excluded the influences of the external environment.  
Management practitioners such as Fredrick Taylor (1911) and Henri Fayol (1949 
translation) articulated theoretical models that became very popular during the 
burgeoning industrial era in the early 20th century (Scott 2003).  Those models are 
classified as closed system models: they consider only the internal elements of a firm in 
their explanations of that firm’s performance (Scott 2003).  By the 1950s, a combination 
of societal changes and social science advancements prompted the development of new 
theories and models of organizations such as the currently prevalent open systems 
models.  These new theories, in combination with the recognized “bewildering variety” 
(Scott 2001 p. 11) of organizations that exist in the world, contribute to the rich field of 
organization research as evident by its diversity of useful models (e.g., Bureaucracy, see 
Weber 1947 translation; M-Form and U-Form, see Chandler 1962; Markets and 
Hierarchies, see Alliances, see Clark 1965; Williamson 1975; Joint Venture, see Pfeffer 
& Nowak 1976; Networks see Miles & Snow 1978; Clans, see Ouchi 1981; Federation, 
see Provan 1983; High Reliability, see Roberts 1990; Virtual see Davidow & Malone 
1992; Edge of Chaos, see Brown & Eisenhardt 1998).  The following sections address the 
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foundation of structural contingency theory of organization design and the foundation of 
emerging knowledge flow theory.  It concludes with a section that describes 
interorganization theory and how structural contingency theory and knowledge flow 
theory converge and provide insightful lenses through with to investigate 
interorganizational responses to disaster situations. 
1. Open System Model 
The open system’s perspective of organizations originated in the early 1950s as 
researchers started to appreciate the complexity that existed in these social systems.  This 
perspective recognizes that organizations have multiple interacting elements that take 
inputs from the environment, execute some process or processes, and produce outputs 
back to the environment (Boulding 1956; Bertalanffy 1962; Katz & Kahn 1966).  That 
perspective led researchers to appreciate the efficacy of viewing organizations as systems 
of coupled interdependent parts that exhibit dynamic behavior (Baum & Rowley 2002).  
This way of viewing organizations stands in stark contrast to the closed systems 
perspective where organizations are perceived as being similar to mechanical systems 
(i.e., severely constrained by rigid, formal structures such as rules and roles) with little 
flexibility (Scott 2003).  
Organization theorists generally agree that the following elements are common to 
all organizations: goals, participants, technology, social structures, boundaries, and the 
environment (Leavitt, Pinfield & Webb 1974; Daft 1998; Baum & Rowley, 2002; Scott 
2003).  These elements are clearly depicted in Scott’s 2008 version of the Leavitt 
Diamond Model of Organization (Leavitt 1965), see Figure 1, where they interact with 
and influence each other.  In the figure, goals define the ends that participants in an 
organization collectively desire to achieve (Scott 2003).  Technology represents the way 
goals are achieved by participants, and is typically recognized as the combination of 
processes and equipment employed by participants (Leavitt 1965; Scott 2003).  Social 
structures refer to recurring patterns of interactions among participants (Scott 2003).  It is 
these recurring patterns that, whether purposefully designed (e.g., job definitions), pre-
existing (e.g., social norms), or emergent (e.g., informal social interactions), produce the 
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coordination among participants that is necessary to achieve organization goals (Scott 
2003).  Boundaries identify the elements that are considered to be within the 
organization.  Stemming from the open systems perspective, the organization boundary is 
depicted in Figure 1 as a dashed line to reflect the integral relationship between the 
elements of the organization and the environment, and the dynamic nature of the 
boundary.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Leavitt’s Diamond Model of Organization (from Scott 2003) 
Open systems models account for both the influence of the environment on a firm 
(e.g., a cybernetic system (Boulding 1956) perspective where feedback from the 
environment plays a crucial role in organizational performance), and the internal 
dynamics that occur within a firm (i.e., firms evolve over time by actually incorporating 
elements of the environment) (Leavitt, Pinfield & Webb 1974; Banner & Gange 1995).  
Open systems theorists view the environment as “the ultimate source of materials, energy 
and information.” (Scott 2003 p. 101)  The environment, therefore, provides the resources 
and impetus that make organizational adaption possible and necessary. 
Early organization theorists such as Taylor (1911) and Fayol (1949 translation) 
employed a rational perspective to explain organization structures.  This rational 
perspective came from the idea that an organization’s structure (e.g., roles and rules) was 
deliberately designed to most efficiently achieve the organization’s goals.  This dominant 








1960s and continues today (Baum & Rowley 2002; Scott 2003).  According to Scott’s 
(2003) “Layered Model” for classifying organization theory development, Contingency 
Theory is one of the open systems, rational theories.  Competing open systems models 
exist; some are rational and others are natural.  A natural system perspective places 
emphasis on observing the behavioral aspect and goal incongruence of participants and 
how informal structures emerge that are not rationally designed.  Transaction Cost 
(Williamson 1975) and Knowledge-based (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995) models are rational 
open systems models, while Population Ecology (Hannan & Freeman 1977) and 
Institutional Theory (DiMaggio & Powell 1982) are natural open systems models.  
The next section focuses on structural contingency theory and provides 
background information regarding organizational structure, a rubric for structural 
elements to consider when designing or investigating an organizations, and contingency 
factors relevant to this research.  
2. Structural Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory is the most widely used research approach in the field of 
organization design (Lawrence 1993; Donaldson 2001; Scott 2003).  March and Simon 
(1958) sparked contingency theory research by articulating the idea that different 
decision-making methods seemed appropriate depending on environmental conditions 
(e.g., uncertainty).  By the early 1960s, a contingency theory paradigm began to 
supersede the classical management school’s pursuit of a universal theory of 
administration and its goal of uncovering the one true best way to organize (Pennings 
1975; Lawrence 1993).  While the term “contingency theory” was coined by Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967), other organization researchers were already exploring the theory’s 
central assumption (see Burns & Stalker 1961; Hage 1965; and Woodward 1965).  
Central to contingency theory is the assumption that there is no one best way to organize 
to obtain desired goals (Galbraith 1977; Lawrence 1993; Donaldson 2001; Scott 2003).  It 
is a theory based on the concept that to achieve high performance (i.e., goal attainment), 
select structural elements of an organization must be in fit with relevant contingency 
factors (e.g., level of environmental uncertainty (Duncan 1979)).   
 17
A contingency factor is a “variable that moderates the effect of an organizational 
characteristic on organizational performance.” (Donaldson 2001 p. 7)  The preponderance 
of contingency theory research investigates the social structures of organizations, hence, 
the distinction structural contingency theory.  The classic elements of organizational 
structures are the division of labor among participants, and the methods of coordinating 
the work performed (Child 1972; Galbraith 1977; Mintzberg 1979; Daft 1998; Scott 
2003).  Division of labor is traditionally depicted as an organizational chart where both 
vertical and horizontal differences in labor are readily distinguishable.  The following 
sections address draw heavily on past organization theorists and specifically Mintzberg’s 
seminal work on organizational structure and specific contingency factors relevant to this 
research, specifically task interdependence and uncertainty.   
a.  Organization Structure   
Mintzberg (1979) developed a theoretically based and empirically sound 
typology of five organization archetypes (e.g., Simple Structure, Machine Bureaucracy, 
Professional Bureaucracy, Divisional Form, and Adhocracy) and five coordinating 
mechanisms—see Figure 2; 1) Direct Supervision (Fayol 1949 translation), 2) 
Standardization of Work (Taylor 1947 and Weber 1947 translation, March 1957), 3) 
Standardization of Skills (March 1957; March & Simon 1958), 4) Standardization of 
Outputs (March 1957; March & Simon 1958), and 5) Mutual Adjustment (March & 
Simon 1958; Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973).  Each archetype is distinguishable by its 
shape, which is based on the predominance of its parts (i.e., Strategic Apex, Middle Line, 
Operating Core, Technostructure, and Support Staff).  As an example, the strategic apex 
(e.g., Company President and top-level managers) dominates how work is coordinated is 
a Simple Structure type organization.  Coordination is achieved through pre-established, 
supervisor developed rules and roles, and by direct supervision where exception (i.e., 
conditions emerge that do not fit the established rules) handling is achieved through 
decision making by top-level personnel.  Notice that in order to establish which 
organization part predominates, the dominate type of coordination mechanism must first  
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be determined.  In Mintzberg’s own words, coordinating mechanisms “should be 
considered the most basic element of structure, the glue that holds organizations 
together.” (Mintzberg 1979 p. 3)  
 
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Elements and Archetypal Examples  
(adapted from Mintzberg 1979 and Nissen 2005) 
Organization theorists tend to agree that there are different types of 
coordination mechanisms and a useful way of categorizing them regards their degree of 
complexity—see Figure 3 (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973; 
Mintzberg 1979; Scott 2003).  The degree of complexity for a coordination mechanism 
involves how workers in an organization handle the inevitable exceptions that arise 
during the conduct of their tasks.  If a worker only has to look to his or her immediate 
supervisor to provide the answer regarding how to resolve an exception, then there is a 
low degree of complexity in that type of coordination mechanism called direct 
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supervision.  On the other hand, if each worker is supposed to resolve their exceptions as 
they arise, and in a way that has a beneficial result for attaining the organization’s goals, 
then they would likely be obliged to consider alternative ways of handling the exception 
and the short and long-term implication of those alternatives on their task as well as the 
tasks that others in the organization perform.  At the same time, the other workers may 
likewise be attempting to resolve a related or separate exception.  That is an example of a 
highly complex (i.e., it requires consideration of many more conditions by many more 
workers) coordination mechanism called mutual adjustment. 
A medium level of complexity in a coordination mechanism is one where 
standardization is imposed in some element of the tasks to be performed.  This requires 
managers to design either, or more likely in combination, standardization of work (i.e., 
the tasks to be conducted), standardization of outputs (i.e., the products being delivered to 
other workers or customers meet specific specifications), or standardization of skills (i.e., 
the workers have similar abilities necessary to produce a coherent product).  In each case, 
the worker is required to have a greater understanding of the rules to minimize the 
amount of conditions that rise to the level of an exception.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Coordination Mechanisms Along a Continuum of Complexity  
(from Mintzberg 1979) 
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b. Design Specifications 
The final elements of Mintzberg’s (1979) organizational treatise are the 
eight design parameters—1) Job Specialization, 2) Behavior Formalization, 3) Training 
and Indoctrination, 4) Unit Grouping, 5) Unit Size, 6) Planning and Control Systems, 7) 
Liaison Devices, and 8) Decentralization, both vertical and horizontal.  These design 
parameters reflect the “discretion” to alter conditions within the organization that 
organization designers and managers have to produce some effect on “how materials, 
authority, information, and decision processes flow through it.” (Mintzberg 1979 p. 65)  
As an example of the relationship of these design factors to contingency theory, consider 
an organization that expands (e.g., adds workers) and holds all other design parameters 
constant, performance is predicted to suffer until the members are reorganized into a new 
form—i.e., move from the previous form to a form that is a better fit (Blau 1970; Blau & 
Schoenherr 1971; Child 1973; Pugh & Hickson 1976; Pugh & Hinings 1976; Daft & 
Bradshaw 1980; Donaldson 1996).  That example reflects just one of the myriad 
organization design rules that Mintzberg (1979) synthesizes.  This combination of 
organization archetypes, coordination mechanisms, and design parameters constitutes “a 
rubric for classifying and analyzing a wide variety of organizational forms” (Nissen 
2005).  The relevance of this rubric to this dissertation is discussed in Section B of this 
chapter on computational organization experimentation. 
c. Structural Contingency Factors   
Donaldson (2001) organizes structural contingency theory research into 
two categories: (1) the organic theories that focus on how organizational effectiveness 
(i.e., the ability to attain goals) is moderated due to the fitness of micro-level structures 
(i.e., structures involving the relationships among the subunits of the organization) to the 
predominant contingencies of task uncertainty (see, Burns & Stalker 1961; Hage 1965; 
Lawrence & Lorsch 1967), task interdependence (see Thompson 1967; Lorsch & 
Lawrence 1972), and technology (see Woodward 1965; Perrow 1967; Thompson 1967; 
Galbraith 1973), and (2) the bureaucracy theories that focus on effectiveness due to 
fitness of macro-level structures primarily to the variables of size (see Chandler 1962; 
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Pugh et al. 1963; Blau 1970; Child 1973) and age (Starbuck 1965; Inkson et al. 1970; 
Samuel & Mannheim 1970).  While the macro-level field has progressed to the point 
where analyzing organizational fitness is operationalized in an expert system (see Burton 
& Obel 2004), researchers continue to explore micro-level issues to identify other 
contingency factors (Lawrence 1993; Burton & Obel 2004).  The next sections cover the 
relevant micro-level contingency factors associated with this research and specifically 
focuses on factors that relate to coordination within the organization and the level of 
complexity that organizations face, specifically task interdependence and task 
uncertainty.  
(1) Task Interdependence.  Interdependence is defined as the 
extent that one organizational subunit relies on a resource (e.g., information and material) 
from another subunit (Daft 1998).  A subunit includes such entities as an individual, work 
group, or department.  Thompson (1967) classified three types of interdependence: (1) 
pooled, (2) sequential, and (3) reciprocal.  Pooled interdependence involves different 
subunits of the same organization that draw from common resources yet have no 
dependence on each other for the accomplishment of their work.  For example, an aid 
organization such as the Salvation Army may have branch offices operating in different 
zones within a disaster area.  As a part of their work to help relieve suffering through 
distribution of aid, each office may draw resources from a common regional pool of 
resources. 
In sequential interdependence, the output of one subunit is the 
input to another subunit.  A city’s emergency operations organization in response to a 
terrorist attack involving hazardous chemicals may require its police forces to provide a 
certain level of security before its hazardous material/fire fighting teams can make the 
environment safe for rescue and emergency medicine teams to treat casualties. 
Reciprocal interdependence involves subunits that both provide 
and are dependent on support from each other.  As an example of reciprocal 
interdependence, consider a military organization responding to a humanitarian disaster; 
the organization would likely have transportation teams and logistics teams.  Each team 
produces an input for the other.  Specifically, transportation teams (e.g., helicopter 
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detachments) move supplies to, and assist in distributing supplies from, forward 
operating bases.  At these forward operating bases, logisticians not only manage the relief 
supply inventory, but they also sustain (e.g., provide fuel, food, and water) the 
transportation units to allow them to continue to move supplies. 
Galbraith (1977) pointed out in his seminal book on information 
processing theory of organizations the correspondence between information processing 
requirements and Thompson’s (1967) types of interdependence.  In short, there is a 
correspondence between the types of interdependence and the intensity of interaction 
(i.e., information processing) between organizational subunits required to achieve 
coordination (Scott 2003).  This is shown by putting interdependence on a categorical 
information processing scale from low to high; pooled is a low form of interdependence 
while reciprocal is a high form.  Sequential interdependence falls in the middle as a 
medium form of interdependence.  This parsimonious correspondence between 
information processing requirements and coordination mechanisms is not as simple as it 
appears, since vestiges of the less sophisticated coordination mechanisms remain while 
the more robust mechanisms emerge and take primacy for coordinating activities 
(Galbraith 1977; Galbraith & Nathanson 1978; Mintzberg 1979).  Hence, this falls along 
a Guttman scale such that higher forms of interdependence are inclusive of the lesser 
forms of interdependence: within organizations, subunits that exhibit reciprocal 
interdependence also have instances of sequential and pooled interdependencies 
(Thompson 1967; Galbraith & Nathanson 1978; Mintzberg 1979).  That Guttman scale is 
depicted in Figure 4.  While the horizontal axis represents categories, one can see that 
categories exist within categories.  The relative size of the categories within a category 
are mere abstractions and do not connote any relative values.  
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Figure 4.   Types of Interdependence  
Thompson (1967) identified a contingency relationship between an 
organization’s performance and the type of coordination mechanism used between 
subunits: performance is dependent on fit between the level of interdependence and the 
level of sophistication of the coordination mechanism (i.e., rules and standard procedures, 
plans and schedules, and mutual adjustment) used.  Galbraith (1973) and Mintzberg 
(1979) made similar conclusions about this fit relationship between the sophistication of 
coordination mechanisms and level of interdependence within organizations.  These 
concepts are integrated here by tying them together based on the correspondence between 
level of complexity of coordination mechanisms and level of complexity associated with 
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type of interdependence.  Figure 5 depicts a useful synthesis of these theoretic 
contributions.  In the figure, degrees of interdependence is substituted for the level of 
complexity that was shown in Figure 3, since both degree of interdependence and 
coordination mechanisms are associated with similar levels of complexity in the amount 
of information that is required to be exchanged to achieve coordination.  Both mutual 
adjustment and reciprocal interdependence require high levels of information exchange 
and consideration of a greater amount of varied types of facts (e.g., resource and 
marketing information) by the workers.  Hence, coordination mechanisms and types of 
interdependence correspond to the degree of complexity (i.e., high, medium, and low). 
 
 
Figure 5.   Continuum of Coordinating Mechanisms 
(2) Task Uncertainty.  Task uncertainty reflects the complexity 
that workers face in an organization (Donaldson 2001).  The open systems model allows 
for this uncertainty to come from the task itself and from the environment.  Burns and 
Stalker (1961) explored uncertainty as a useful construct to differentiate the types of 
environment that organizations face.  They characterized the environment as stable or 
unstable depending on the rate of change of inputs (e.g., resources) and outputs (e.g., 
demand).  Others explored similar constructs regarding the environment (homogeneous 
or heterogeneous, see Thompson 1967; Simple or Complex, see Duncan 1972; and 
Placid, Placid-clustered, Disturbed-reactive, or Turbulent, see Emery & Trist 1963; 1965; 
and Terreberry 1968) and concluded that the higher the variety of variables (e.g., how 
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many types of expertise are desired), or dynamics exhibited by an organization’s 
environment meant that the organization faced higher uncertainty.  Burns and Stalker 
(1961) identified a performance relationship between the level of environmental 
uncertainty and organization structure: performance depends on fit between the level of 
environmental uncertainty and the way firms organize to perform tasks.  Mechanistic 
structures—i.e., structures that are characterized by hierarchical distribution of decision 
making, formalization of rules, and specialization of workers’ roles—are fit with 
environments that exhibit low uncertainty (Burns & Stalker 1961; Hage 1965; Fry & 
Slocum 1984; Pennings 1992).  Organic structures—i.e., structures that are marked by 
decentralized decision-making authority and flexible roles performed by broadly 
knowledgeable workers—are fit with high uncertainty environments (Burns & Stalker 
1961; Hage 1965; Fry & Slocum 1984; Pennings 1992).  These conclusions found 
support in many related studies (see Thompson 1967; Child 1975; Lawrence & Dyer 
1983; Dess & Beard 1984).  Related contingency research (see Hage 1965; Woodward 
1965; Hage & Aiken 1970; Miles & Snow 1978; Gresov 1990) led some to conclude that 
environmental uncertainty and task uncertainty can be subsumed under the concept of a 
more encompassing notion of task contingency (Lawrence & Dyer 1983; Donaldson 
2001; Scott 2003). 
3. Knowledge Flow Theory   
The emergence of knowledge as a critical organizational resource (Nonaka 1995; 
Grant 1996; Spender 1996; von Krogh 1998) prompted more attention in organization 
design research.  While Burton and Obel (2004) incorporated much of the structural 
contingency research into their organizational diagnosis and design expert system 
Organizational Consultant (OrgCon®), they recognized the growing body of work in the 
field of knowledge flow theory (see Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Alavi & Leidner 2001; 
Nissen 2006b) and more specifically structural contingency theoretic studies that 
hypothesize knowledge as a contingency factor (see Rulke & Galaskiewicz 2000; 
Becerra-Fernandez & Sabherwal 2001; Birkinshaw, Nobel & Ridderstrale 2002; Postrel 
2002; Ibrahim & Nissen 2003) and its potential to influence organizational design.  
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Currently, this body of contingency theory research is sparse and only shows “…partial 
support for the “fit” hypothesis in contingency theory.” (Burton & Obel 2004 p. 10)  This 
research furthers the argument that knowledge is a structural contingency factor. 
The concept of knowledge has many facets: taxonomic work has produced 
frequent debate over descriptions of the various perspectives and types of knowledge (see 
Alavi & Leidner 2001).  Here, knowledge is defined as a “justified true belief” that 
enables action (Nonaka 1994 p. 15).  This definition accounts for the human process of 
justifying personal beliefs.  For a person to take some action there must be some personal 
belief that the action will lead to a predicted result.  Hence, knowledge enables action 
(Nissen 2006b).  From an organizational performance perspective, it is this point that 
Nonaka (1994) stresses as critical for organizations to understand as opposed to the more 
“passive and static” (p,14) information processing theory (see Galbraith 1972).  
Knowledge flow theory focuses on the dynamic creation and transfer of knowledge in 
complex creative tasks such as problem solving and innovation (Nonaka 1994).  
Leweling (2007) shows convincing evidence that the performance of problem solving 
groups is enhanced when information and knowledge are shared as opposed to just when 
the groups only share information. 
Many differing concepts of knowledge have been proffered (for a summary see 
Alavi & Leidner 2001 and Nissen 2006a); however, an epistemic distinction is made that 
classifies knowledge into two types: tacit and explicit (Polanyi 1966).  Tacit knowledge is 
the personal know-how and mental models developed through experiences (e.g., the 
combination of developed feel for balance and balance correction techniques applicable 
to riding a bicycle enables one to ride—Polanyi 1966).  A common characteristic of tacit 
knowledge is that it is not easily transferred from one place or person to another (i.e., it is 
sticky—von Hippel 1994; Nonaka 1995; Nissen 2006b).  Explicit knowledge, on the 
other hand, is know-how that is codified (e.g., formalized written procedures, such as 
cooking recipes).  This type of knowledge is more easily moved; however, a key aspect 
of explicit knowledge is that it cannot completely capture all that is known tacitly.   
This epistemic distinction is used in this research because “the distinction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge…is the most enduring and prominent in a dynamic 
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context.” (Nissen 2006a p. 17)  While knowledge creation and transfer (e.g., learning) are 
key dynamic aspects of knowledge, in an organizational context, knowledge must also be 
applied (i.e., put into action to achieve goals).  It is theorized that knowledge, especially 
tacit, is a powerful resource that firms utilize and create to positively affect performance 
(Nonaka 1995; Grant 1996, von Krogh 1998; Nissen 2006a), but there is a tension 
between the knowledge work involving creation and application tasks.  This is referred to 
as the “knowing-doing gap.” (Pfeffer & Sutton 1999) 
Knowledge management and organizational learning theories state that there 
should be a purposeful balance between exploration and exploitation tasks—i.e., those 
tasks that contribute directly to knowledge creation and work respectively (March 1991; 
Nissen 2006b).  The dynamic theory of knowledge creation (Nonaka’s 1994) contends 
that organizational performance will increase when explicit and especially tacit 
knowledge are able to broadly flow throughout an organization in support of both 
exploration and exploitation tasks (Nonaka 1995; Nissen 2005).  Nonaka (1994) 
theorized that there were four modes of knowledge conversion that accounted for all 
flows; they are socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization—see Table 
2.  Socialization is the tacit-to-tacit flow of knowledge and is typically found in the close 
observation and “hands on” experience of doing something (e.g., an apprentice learning 
from a craftsman by observation, imitation and on-the-job training).  Externalization is 
the transfer of tacit-to-explicit knowledge; typically, this takes the form of writing 
instructions after reflecting on how some action was performed.  Combination is a 
process where knowledge is exchanged in its explicit form such as through face-to-face 
discussions in meetings and transferring written instructions by file transfer.  Finally, 
internalization is the process of taking explicit knowledge such as a written or verbal set 
of instructions and coming to a personal understanding of them (e.g., learning the 





                     To   
  From 
Tacit Knowledge Explicit Knowledge 
Tacit Knowledge Socialization Externalization 
Explicit Knowledge Internalization Combination 
Table 2. Modes of Knowledge Creation  
(from Nonaka 1994) 
Knowledge creation and learning, which are essential to solving novel problems 
and improving task performance respectively, are theorized to “hinge on a dynamic 
interaction between the different modes of knowledge conversion.”  (Nonaka 1994 p. 19)  
This shifting between modes, although not required, is theorized to be most productive 
when it follows a cycle between tacit and explicit forms of knowledge.  That cycle is 
represented as a spiral pattern of ever-increasing knowledge—see Figure 6 (Nonaka 
1994).  Nissen (2006b) extended that model to a useful four-dimensional model that 
facilitates better understanding of knowledge dynamics in the broader context of 
organizations. 
  
Figure 6.   Spiral of Organization Knowledge Creation 
(from Nonaka 1994) 
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The four dimensions of Nissen’s (2006b) model (Figure 7) are epistemological 
(i.e., a dimension that classifies knowledge as either tacit or explicit), ontological (i.e., a 
dimension that distinguishes social levels such as individuals, groups, organization and 
interorganization), life cycle (i.e., an ontological dimension that distinguishes activities of 
knowledge, such as create and apply), and flow time (i.e., a temporal dimension 
representing the rate at which knowledge flows, for simplicity of representing this fourth 
dimension “fast” and “slow” are the two categories used) (Nissen 2006b).  The temporal 
dimension is not shown in this generic figure, but it is represented by different 
thicknesses of the vectors that track the dynamic movement of knowledge through the 
other dimensions.  Through use of this four-dimensional model, a manager can represent 
how knowledge is flowing and thereby identify knowledge gaps where resident 
knowledge is not broadly influencing performance—i.e., where tacit knowledge is 
isolated or “clumping” and not flowing.  With the gaps revealed, the manager may target 
new ways to stimulate or trigger knowledge flows in productive ways that lead to 
increasing knowledge or enhancing task performance.  These “ways” to stimulate 
knowledge flows can be viewed as a rational organization design choice; hence, a 
contingency theoretic perspective is apropos to investigating this management issue.  The 
following sections review the burgeoning research on knowledge being an important 




Figure 7.   Knowledge Flow Life Cycle Model (from Nissen 2006b) 
a. Knowledge as a Contingency Factor 
While theoretical and empirical studies about knowledge creation and 
transfer are growing, the contingency theory work in this area remains sparse and focused 
on within team phenomena (Leweling 2007).  Since 2001, researchers have been working 
to extend structural contingency theory to consider knowledge as a contingency factor 
when making organization design decisions (Rulke & Galaskiewicz 2000; Becerra-
Fernandez & Sabherwal 2001; Birkinshaw, Nobel & Ridderstrale 2002; Postrel 2002; 
Ibrahim & Nissen 2003).  Knowledge research regarding organization design is gaining 
momentum; however, it remains sparse and unfocused when compared to the extent of 
other contingency theory research.  Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal’s (2001) research 
focused on participants’ perceived satisfaction with knowledge management as its 
performance factor, while Birkinshaw, Nobel and Ridderstrale’s (2002) study did not 
address structural contingency factors, rather it focused solely on the effects that 
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knowledge observibility (i.e., how easy is it to reverse engineer the knowledge used to 
produce the product from observing the final product—from Zander & Kogut 1995) 
interacting with system embeddedness (i.e., how tied is the product development process 
to a physical location—from  Brown & Duguid (1991) and Tyre & von Hippel (1997)) 
contribute to the numbers of patents achieved as a performance measure. 
Rulke and Galaskiewicz (2000) built on the small group performance 
literature (see Steiner 1972; Shaw 1981; McGrath 1984; Jackson 1992; Liang 1994; 
Stasser & Stewart 1992) which points to a “strong relationship between knowledge 
possessed by group members and performance.” (Rulke & Galaskiewicz 2000 p. 612)  In 
the condition where the problems faced by a team are complex, the contingent effects of 
structure (i.e., hierarchical or decentralized pattern of relationships among group 
members) interacting with different distributions of knowledge (i.e., teams made up of all 
generalists compared to all specialists and a mixture of specialists and generalists) are 
mostly consistent with classical structural contingency theory (see Burns & Stalker 1962; 
Thompson 1967; Duncan 1979; Shaw 1981; Argote et al. 1989; Donaldson 2001)—
showing that decentralized structures  perform better than centralized structures (Rulke & 
Galaskiewicz 2000; Powley & Nissen 2009).  Their research showed one exception: 
teams comprised of generalists performed equally well in either group structure (Rulke & 
Galaskiewicz 2000).   
One possible explanation for that universal finding is that only at the end 
of the two-year study, did Rulke and Galaskiewicz (2000) apply social network analysis 
principles to distinguish groups as either hierarchical or decentralized.  This discounts 
other research findings that coordination mechanisms may change over time (Gulati & 
Singh 1998; Harris & Beyerlein 2003).  In the Rulke and Galaskiewicz (2000) study, 
subjects were asked to report whose work they relied upon and who they thought relied 
upon their work throughout an experiment.  This relates to the idea that organization 
structure is revealed through information flows (Galbraith 1977; Taylor & Van Every 
2000).  The social network approach, however, does not account for the degree of 
formalization (e.g., decision-making roles or information-processing rules) in the groups.  
In other words, although each group was prescribed a traditional hierarchical decision 
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making and information processing structure (e.g., a team president, and three functional 
vice-presidents), no control over formalization was apparent so each group’s social 
network structure could have evolved over time.  Since sampling to assess social 
structure only occurred at the end of the two-year study, the accumulation of the 
performance over time compared to the determined structure at the end of the experiment 
may have masked the contribution of different structures that might have emerged and 
functioned along the way. 
b. Related Knowledge Dynamics Research 
The dynamic theory of knowledge, on the other hand, stresses the 
importance of knowledge flows, especially of tacit knowledge flows, to sustaining 
competitive advantage and high performance (Nonaka 1995; Nissen 2006b).  As task 
uncertainty increases, agility is postulated as an important organizational characteristic 
(Postrel 2002; Mowshowitz 2002; Alberts & Hayes 2003).  Agility connotes movement: 
the ability to modify or change—to enact other existing knowledge in the place of how 
something had been done (e.g., using a different procedure, or applying a different mental 
model to help understand a situation) or create new knowledge (e.g., developing a new 
problem solving strategy, or a novel solution to complex problems).  Today, 
organizations generally have many knowledge acquisition options (e.g., hiring additional 
expertise, or partnering with another organization) to attain the requisite variety (Ashby 
1958) necessary to perform well in the face of new complex, dynamic environments 
(Mowery, Oxley & Silverman 1996; Baker & Faulkner 2002; Scott 2003).  During a 
crisis or disaster response situation, managers may not have a high degree of control over 
the availability of expertise (e.g., generalist or specialist) and experience from the 
organization on hand, or available in the short term, when initiating problem solving 
processes. 
Nissen and Levitt (2004) employ computational agent-based organization 
modeling to explore the effects of knowledge flows on organizational performance.  The 
research focuses on the potential contributions to organizational performance of 
knowledge flows associated with learning (e.g., through formal training courses), skill 
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level development (e.g., through on the job training), and team experience (e.g., through 
individuals working together over time).  The results highlight the potential counter 
intuitive cause and effect interactions associated with how a training course might be 
sequenced with work tasks (e.g., concurrently or prerequisite) and yield significantly 
different project outcomes in terms of cost, time and quality due to the effects of 
knowledge flows. 
Other researchers have addressed different knowledge constructs and how 
they relate to performance.  The theory of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal 1990) 
states that the more a person knows, the more they can learn, but it is silent on whether or 
not the effects are more or less pronounced in teams made up of generalist, specialist or a 
mix of both.  Postrel (2002) addresses generalist (i.e., trans-specialist) and specialist team 
composition issues from a manufacturing organization perspective and concludes a 
contingency theoretic perspective that, “Industries where the process technology is 
mature and stable, but product innovation is high should display relatively high levels of 
trans-specialist understanding between design and manufacturing, while industries where 
process technology is dynamic but product innovation is slower should see relatively low 
trans-specialist understanding.” (Postrel 2002 p. 315)  That research leaves open for 
future investigation the management issues associated with how to “devise a structure of 
governance that will motivate the parties to cooperate.” (Postrel 2002 p. 316)  According 
to Krause (1984), cooperation produces a smoother meshing of endeavors (i.e., actions); 
hence, it strongly relates to knowledge flows. 
Nissen et al. (2008) challenge some of Postrel’s fundamental assumptions, 
especially that performance (i.e., expected payoff) is unidimensional; drawing on 
microeconomic and organization theory, they point out that “performance is a 
multifaceted, omnibus concept with many trade-offs between sub-dimensions such as 
cost, time, component quality and product integration quality (e.g., Smith & Reinerstan, 
1991; Bayus, 1997).” (Nissen et al. 2008, p.126)  Furthermore, they develop and test, 
using computational organization modeling techniques, a variety of theoretically sound 
hypotheses relevant to Postrel’s specialist and trans-specialist construct.  Of particular 
note is their use of computational organization theory to test the marginal value of trans-
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specialists in the face of increasing modularity of the sub-parts of a company’s product, 
component complexity, reciprocal interdependence, and centralization.  
The theory of transactive memory (Wenger 1986) appears to support a 
contingency theoretic perspective regarding interdependence, and their relationship to 
knowledge flows and performance.  Transactive memory theory suggests that the level of 
interdependence should inform managers about how best to organize (i.e., arrange the 
organization’s meta-knowledge or who knows what knowledge).  If the tasks that 
participants in the organization perform are largely independent vice interdependent, then 
an integrated transactive memory system where everyone has similar knowledge (e.g., a 
local police force) is appropriate.  When tasks for participants are interdependent, then a 
differentiated transactive memory system, where special expertise resides in different 
people or groups and for the most part everyone knows the locations of the expertise 
(e.g., federal crime laboratory) is appropriate.  This theory suggests that management 
should play a role in appropriately adjusting knowledge resources to facilitate flows that 
will enhance organization performance—hence, making management decisions to 
increase design fit.   
These theories along with knowledge flow theory suggest that managers 
should consider the importance of knowledge as a contingency factor in organization 
design—especially as it relates to coordination mechanisms and their influence on 
knowledge flows that lead to high levels of performance.  Complicating this organization 
design task for management is the nearly instant access to knowledge resources beyond 
the manager’s traditional purview—i.e., beyond the firm’s boundaries.  That access is 
facilitated by the ubiquity of networks of communications channels (e.g., cellular 
telephones and the Internet), not only within an organization, but with other entities of the 
external environment.  The following sections present background information on the 
subject of interorganizational entities. 
4. Interorganizational Theory  
The open system perspective for investigating organizational phenomena provides 
researchers the ability to probe cooperative and competitive relationships between 
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organizations.  Two main thrusts in interorganization research emerged over time, dyadic 
cooperative relationships between organizations (see Evan 1966; Aken & Hage 1968; 
Pfeffer & Nowak 1976, Molnar & Rogers 1979; Whetten & Leung 1979; and Van de Ven 
& Walker 1984) and networks of organizations (Provan 1983; Miles & Snow 1995; 
Kraatz 1998; Topper & Carley 1999; Kogut 2000).  Networks can be viewed as 
exhibiting competitive or cooperative behavior.  Organization ecology researchers 
investigate competitive behaviors and organization pathology issues (see Weick 1979; 
Carrol 1984).  Interorganizational communities and interorganizational fields are two 
other categories of research that explore cooperative relationships among organizations 
(Scott 2003).  Interorganizational community research developed from Hawley (1950) 
and Warren (1967); these researchers looked at symbiotic relationships between 
organizations that were interdependent due to geographic co-location (Scott 2003).  
Organizational field research, on the other hand, looks at organizations that are 
functionally interdependent and perhaps even isomorphic (i.e., have nearly identical 
structures such as military organizations) (Levine & White 1961; Schermerhorn 1979; 
DiMaggio 1986; Daft 1998; Scott 2003).  This dissertation focuses within the 
organization field, where functionally similar organizations adapt and cooperate to meet 
the challenges of a dynamic environment. 
In this dissertation, the organization field is the level of analysis because it limits 
the scope of interorganizational entities being considered, and is a logical stepping stone 
to future research at more complex levels of analysis.  In the area of disaster response 
situations, there are relevant instances of functionally similar organization that respond to 
crisis events, so the finding of this research are generalizable and helpful in building a 
bridge to investigating even more complex interorganizational crisis management issues, 
such as when diverse organizations (e.g., military and non-governmental) come together 
in response to a disaster.  
Due to the complex nature of interorganizational social systems, researchers often 
employ qualitative methods and investigate the antecedents of interorganizational 
relationship formation (e.g., the quest for complementary knowledge) and how those 
factors translate into governance structures (Whetten & Aldrich 1979; Mulford & Rogers 
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1982; Smith, Carroll & Ashford 1995; Kenis & Knoke 2002; Suparamaniam & Dekker 
2003).  This is especially prevalent in disaster research of interorganizational phenomena. 
Warren’s (1967) seminal work describes a continuum of interorganizational 
governance structures (see Figure 8) ranging from social choice to an independent unitary 
organization.  Social choice is where autonomy in goal setting and decision making by 
each organization is paramount and coordination is achieved by what Granovetter (1973) 
refers to as weak ties and informal communications (Litwak & Hylton1962; Warren 
1967).  An example of this is the early stages of a new charity such as a community chest 
(see Andrews (1952) Corporation Giving) where independent benefactor organizations 
come together to mutually fulfill a community need (Litwak & Hylton 1962).  A merger, 
on the other hand, is an instantiation of the independent unitary organization.  It governs 
much like the strategic apex in a bureaucracy; hence, it can be viewed as an 
intraorganization phenomenon (Litwak & Hylton1962; Warren 1967).  A unitary 
organization’s leadership dictates its own structural coordination mechanisms (e.g., 
creation of a joint venture or a military combined joint task force).  Between those 
extremes are coalitions and federations.  A coalition’s governance structure entails a 
strategic intent to work together (e.g., coordinate activities) made by each participating 
organization.  This drives the formal requirement to coordinate some activities, but does 
not necessitate usage of formal information processing rules.  Two examples of coalition 
activities are joint purchasing decisions (see Evan 1966) and major disaster relief efforts 
by multiple countries’ militaries and non-governmental aid organizations (see case study 
examples regarding the December 2004 Asian Tsunami in Thailand (Weerawat 2007) 
and the August 2005 Hurricane Katrina (Beccera-Fernandez et al. 2008)), especially in 
the case where the disaster has overwhelmed the affected country’s ability to coordinate 
activities.   
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Figure 8.   Continuum of Interorganizational Coordination Structures 
Warren’s (1967) final governance structure is the federation.  It entails multiple 
organizations agreeing to formally allow a “third party” to coordinate their activities 
(e.g., a sports league and a United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator or an Emergency 
Relief Coordinator—see Weiss & Campbell 1991 and Stephenson 2005).  There is a 
significant difference in the degree of decision-making authority in the two examples of 
federations: the National Football League commissioner and his office generally have 
tighter control over coordinating the operations of the league than a United Nations 
Disaster Relief Coordinator has over the myriad governmental and non-governmental 
organizations that might respond to a crisis.  “Tighter control” generally refers to having 
more formalized means to elicit desired performance (Etzioni 1965).  A study of the 
humanitarian operations in the former Yugoslavia (see Minear 1994) or Operation 
Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq (see Weiss & Campbell 1991) are examples of the 
weaker form of federative control. 
The federation and unitary organization are bureaucratic governance structures 
and the social choice and coalition are organic governance structures.  These correspond 
well to degree of control from the intraorganization literature—specifically Mintzberg’s 
(1979) design parameters of formalization and centralization.  Some organization 
scholars have postulated that traditional contingency factors (e.g., task uncertainty and 
task interdependence) of organization design (i.e., intraorganization design) provide a 
sound explanation regarding the type of coordination mechanisms (e.g., organic with 
mutual adjustment mechanisms rather than bureaucratic with direct supervision  
mechanisms) that are in fit for the interorganizational structures that operate when 
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multiple organizations start working together (Dynes & Aguirre 1976; Wright 1976; 
Mulford & Rogers 1982; Scott & Meyer 1991; Ishida & Ohta 2001).   
In a disaster situation, organizations face high uncertainty and reciprocal 
interdependencies, hence, mutual adjustment mechanism are most fit (Dynes & Aguirre 
1976; Comfort 1994; Harrald et al. 1994).  Others propose that hierarchical responses are 
the best mechanism for interorganization coordination in crisis response situations 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Bigley & Roberts 2001; Moynihan 2006; Gonzalez 2008).  The 
essence of the disagreement revolves around the assumption that interorganizational 
systems emerge to deal with increased environmental uncertainty and that the formation 
generally begets reciprocal resource interdependencies.  Structural contingency theory 
research at the organization level suggests that organic structures are fit to meet the 
increased uncertainty and reciprocal interdependencies; however, Pfeffer and Nowak 
(1976), drawing on legacy data from large firms heavily engaged in research and 
development, claimed to find support for their hypothesis that the appropriate 
interorganizational structure is one that will reduce uncertainty between the 
organizations—i.e., a governance structure that is more bureaucratic and stresses 
formalizing patterns of interaction.  Gonzales (2008) used case study research from 
multiple disaster response exercises, and found mediation (i.e., a hierarchical approach 
involving a leader that handles exceptions) to be the most prevalent and most effective 
coordination mechanism.  Dekker and Suparamaniam (2005) pointed out that the choice 
of governance structure was frequently predicated on the parent companies’ existing 
culture and structure.   
Other researchers point to the structures employed during past collaborative 
interactions (Westphal, Gulati & Shortell 1997).  These past familiar governance 
structures likely have at their root, the perception of requiring lower coordination costs 
(Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967; Williamson 1975).  Contingency theory 
research is a useful method for informing this debate, but the level of complexity in these 
interorganizational systems presents formidable challenges to the researcher, especially in 
the area of disaster events where the emergence of interorganizational systems is 
prevalent.  
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Disaster events generally include participation by governmental agencies.  Since 
the government sector is flush with stalwart bureaucratic organizations, there is a high 
probability that the formation of interorganizational relationships in response to a disaster 
event will be affected by a natural desire to set up a familiar governance structure 
(Westphal, Gulati & Shortell 1997; Dekker & Suparamaniam 2005).  Since no two 
organizations are identical, each organization that responds to a disaster will have 
different structural parameters.  These different structures present challenges to 
coordinating activities, especially when cultural differences and varying degrees of trust 
exist between organizations (Suparamanian & Dekker 2003).  Trust refers to one’s (e.g., 
individual or organization) belief and expectation that its assets, while in some state of 
risk, are safe in the presence of others (Young 2003).  A prime source of low trust stems 
from a lack of experience in operating together (Wright 1976).  The following sections 
provide background information about interorganizational systems and specifically 
focuses on instances when organizations come together to operate in a virtual 
environment and form in the special circumstances during the early stages of a disaster 
response. 
a. Interorganizational Systems 
Interorganizational systems are defined as “planned and intentionally 
formed cooperative ventures between otherwise independent agents.” (Kumar & van 
Dissel 1996)  They are becoming more prevalent today largely because they can share 
costs, spread risk, and access complementary resources, especially knowledge, to help 
them succeed in growing environmental complexity (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman 1996).  
While more firms are making the strategic decision to cooperate with other organizations, 
researchers have left unattended the mechanisms for how the practitioners should be 
organized to attain the desired goals.  Practitioners, here, are those who have to generate 
the dynamic knowledge flows between the partnering organizations (Schermerhorn 
1979).  Those people are referred to in organization literature as boundary spanners 
(Mintzberg 1979; Thompson 1967). 
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Interorganizational systems can include a variety of independent 
organizations that take on some role in a developing structure among the organizations.  
Often, deliberate planning and time are required for these organizations to become 
effective at achieving their interorganizational goals (Inkpen & Li 1999).  There are, 
however, instances where time is not a luxury, such as during a crisis (e.g., natural 
disaster).  Creating interorganization action among government agencies in these extreme 
events often entails forming an entity that would resemble a joint venture (i.e., the 
resource contributions from two or more organizations that go to form a new organization 
that gets its goals from the parent firms, see Daft 1998).  It can be argued that because 
those joint ventures emanated from bureaucratically structured organizations they tend to 
be likewise structured—i.e., due to the strong acculturation process in many 
governmental organizations, familiarity with known structures are favored over the 
consideration of contingency factors and the concept of fit (Comfort 1985).  While 
research has been done on knowledge flows in extreme organizations (see Nissen, Jansen, 
Jones & Thomas 2004; Nissen 2005), this research adds to the understanding of 
knowledge flows and organization design issues at the interorganizational level of 
analysis.   
In either deliberate or crisis situations, forming interorganizational 
systems requires that some agents from each organization involve themselves in initiating 
the necessary structures (e.g., roles and processes) to achieve satisfactory 
interorganizational performance.  Those initially involved agents fit the definition of a 
boundary spanner unit: an organizational unit that interfaces with the external 
environment (Mintzberg 1979; Thompson 1967).  Early boundary spanning activity is 
postulated as critical to achieving the goals that drive the formation of an 
interorganization system (Schermerhorn 1979).  Hence, the need to provide managers 
insights into how to manage their workers that conduct tasks through virtual 
environments and in the challenging arena of interorganizational alliances (Smith, Carroll 
& Ashford 1995; Alavi & Tiwana 2002). 
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b. Virtual Organizations 
The desire for virtual products (i.e., a product instantaneously produced in 
response to a customer’s demand) is considered a key driver in the creation of virtual 
organizations (Davidow & Malone 1992).  “A virtual organization is a collection of 
geographically distributed, functionally and/or culturally diverse entities that are linked 
by electronic forms of communications and rely on lateral, dynamic relationships for 
coordination.” (DeSanctis & Monge 1999, p. 693)  Hence, virtual organizations “appear 
less a discrete enterprise and more an ever-varying cluster of common activities in the 
midst of a vast fabric of relationships.” (Davidow & Malone 1992, p. 7)  They are 
characterized as being highly flexible and adaptable and able to respond quickly to 
market demands (Grabowski & Roberts 1999).  Those characteristics combined with the 
reduced costs of electronic communications and the growing ubiquity of Internet-based 
collaborative applications, especially those that have a high level of media richness (for 
examples see Daft & Lengel 1986), contribute to the growing efficacy of virtual 
organizations (Nohria & Berkley 1994; Hedberg et al. 1997; DeSanctis & Monge 1999; 
Wong & Burton 2000; Mowshowitz 2002).   
In related work, Clancy (1994) defines the characteristics of a virtual team 
as being made of participants that are culturally diverse and employees of different 
organizations that are physically separated; this puts virtual teams squarely in the 
interorganizational system area of research and brings into focus the need to analyze the 
virtual teaming phenomenon and specifically investigate “how to best structure a virtual 
organization, when communication has to transcend the boundaries of space, time and 
culture, for efficient and effective coordination….” (Wong & Burton 2000, p. 340)  This 
puts an increasing emphasis on understanding the contingency relationship of knowledge 
and organizational structures on the interaction between teams that span the boundary of 
their own organization to work coordination and problem solving tasks with the boundary 
spanning teams of partner organizations.  A boundary spanning team is one “whose 
primary responsibility is to deal with parties outside the organization, such as clients, 
suppliers and research institutions.” (Callahan & Salipante 1979 p. 26)  In the context of  
 
 42
this research, boundary spanners facilitate coordination and problem solving in the face 
of turbulent environments—i.e., these tasks involve both knowledge sharing and 
knowledge creation activities. 
Wong and Burton (2000) investigated the phenomenon of virtual teams by 
constructing a theoretically grounded, agent-based computational discrete event 
simulation model as an experimentation platform.  Their conceptualization of virtual 
teams in their agent-based model is theoretically grounded in the area of group 
performance.  Their investigation, however, did not explore the impact that the virtual 
team members’ knowledge characteristics had on team performance. 
Organizations that work together through virtual teams are guided by a 
common purpose and interact through interdependent tasks (Lipnack & Stamps 1997; 
Wong & Burton 2000).  Virtual teams are project-focused—they are formed when the 
need arises and disbanded when the task is complete (Grenier & Metes 1995; Simons 
1995).  Such dynamic teaming implies that there is not only little prior team history, but 
also that the work roles and responsibilities of team members change with each virtual 
team with which they are engaged.  Those observations led to the development of three 
characteristics of team virtuality: (1) virtual team context; (2) virtual team composition; 
and (3) virtual team structure (Wong & Burton 2000). 
The context under which virtual teams operate is generally marked by a 
low degree of experience working with other team members, facing novel tasks, and 
physical dispersion of members.  Virtual teams are composed of people with 
heterogeneity in their organizational backgrounds and cultures.  The structure of virtual 
teams is marked by a prevalence of lateral but weak ties.  These lateral, weak ties are 
conducive to knowledge creation, but not knowledge sharing which is facilitated by 
strong ties (Alavi & Tiwana 2002).  In the virtual team context, however, knowledge 
flows via strong ties must travel across the same communications channels (Wong & 
Burton 2000; Nissen et al. 2008).  This may lead to performance problems especially 
when team members have a high degree of tacit knowledge to share.  In the context of 
virtual teams, strong vertical ties can be achieved by structuring under a direct 
supervision coordination mechanism.  The use of strong ties may be important where the 
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tolerance for errors in the work to be coordinated is low (Wong & Burton 2000), and 
were a high degree of common knowledge in the early stages of a crisis is not available 
(Suparamaniam & Dekker 2003; Moynihan 2006).  
Combining the issues raised with Rulke and Glaskiewicz’s (2000) 
research with the work of Wong and Burton (2000), this research looks more deeply into 
the composition of the virtual teams based on the tacit and explicit knowledge distinction, 
and the type of coordination mechanisms that these groups often operate under during 
crisis situations.  Drawing on Nissen et al. (2008), the following relevant organizational 
performance metrics are useful to explore as they present many tradeoffs between the 
sub-dimensions of organization performance: speed, component quality and product 
integration (e.g., Smith & Reinersten 1991; Bayus 1997).  These metrics are associated 
with relevant hypotheses in the next section. 
c. Interorganization Response to Disasters  
Disaster events trigger the response of a large number of organizations 
(Emery & Trist 1965; Dynes 1970; Wright 1976; Quarantelli 1978), many of which begin 
to work together, hence, constituting an interorganizational entity.  Sometimes the 
emergence of these entities is pre-planned, but often, even the pre-planned 
interorganizational system must interface with unforeseen organizations (Suparamaniam 
& Dekker 2003).  Topper and Carley (1999) used qualitative methods and social network 
analysis techniques to investigate the emergent network of organizations that they call the 
integrated crisis management units (ICMU): a relevant and common instantiation of an 
interorganizational phenomenon in response to disasters.  They draw into focus three 
competing theoretic perspectives that potentially explain the ICMUs, 1) the emergent 
coordinating group (e.g., see Dynes & Quarantelli 1968; Dynes 1978; Kreps 1978; 
Perrow 1984; Drabek 1986; Harrald et al. 1994), 2) the centralized system (e.g., see 
Meyer & Rowan 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Staw et al. 1981; DiMaggio & Powell 
1983), and 3) the distributed system (e.g., Dynes & Quarantelli 1968; Lawrence & 
Lorsch 1969; Galbraith 1973; Malone 1987; Comfort 1994; Harrald et al. 1994). 
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The emergent coordinating group perspective predicts that groups of 
organizations will “spontaneously coalesce during a crisis to help manage the 
interdependencies of individual responding organizations and to reduce conflict.” 
(Topper & Carley 1999 p. 69)  The participants in this coordination group may have little 
experience or authority to perform the required tasks.  In large-scale disasters that require 
extensive resources, the mutual adjustment coordination mechanism appears to be only 
“accidentally effective.” (Wright 1976 p. 82)  Furthermore, for coordination by mutual 
adjustment to emerge, it seems to require a lack of available coordination expertise 
(Wright 1976).  The general trend to the development over time of the emergent 
coordinating group is to start with mostly disconnected organizations and a few pre-
planned coordination structures operating.  This is followed by a phase of self-organizing 
behavior where new coordination structures between pairs of organizations emerge.  
Finally, a migration phase occurs where these paired coordination structures form into a 
central coordination group and every organization is connected to a central group of 
powerful organizations (Dynes & Quarantelli 1968; Topper & Carley 1999).  Powerful 
generally refers to a preponderance of resources (Pfeffer & Nowak 1978) or the ability to 
confer legitimacy (e.g., governmental agencies) (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan 1977). 
The centralized system looks to a single organization to assume the 
dominate coordination role for the rest of the organizations in its affected area.  It is often 
the case that pre-disaster contingency planning efforts seek to design this 
interorganizational coordination method into the response plan.  This centralized 
coordination method—similar to direct supervision, seeks to capitalize on perceived 
vertical information processing efficiencies and reduction of uncertainty within the 
interorganizational system.  This is attributable to a propensity of organizations to 
centralize, rigidify, and seek an external source of legitimacy in an effort to mitigate the 
uncertainty produced by the turbulent environmental conditions brought on by the 
disaster (Staw et al. 1981; Topper & Carley 1999).  These ideations are supported by both 
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) and institutionalism theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977).  Wright (1976) drew on multiple 
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disaster event case studies and identified an apparent contingency theoretic perspective 
that interorganization coordination through centralized control was more likely to be 
effective in smaller disasters where fewer resources were needed, so some resource slack 
was available, and actors with appropriate coordination expertise were available.   
The development of this centralized coordination system begins with 
already well-formed relationships that are defined in pre-planned (i.e., formalized) 
structural relationships.  As the disaster unfolds, centralization grows in response to 
growing complexity: other organizations not accounted for in the pre-planning join the 
coordination network.  This centralized system is very similar to “military style” 
coordination network typically referred to as a command and control organization.  This 
pre-planning and centralized control, however, has been maligned in other prominent 
disaster research studies (see Harrald et al. 1994, Dynes 1998, and Suparamaniam & 
Dekker 2003) 
The distributed system draws on contingency and information processing 
theories.  These theories explain that distributed team-like structures respond quickly and 
accurately to the turbulent environments found when responding to disasters (Carley & 
Lin 1997; Topper & Carley 1999).  Others have corroborated these finding, pointing to 
organizational agility and lateral ties between subsystems being fit with turbulent 
environments (see Krackhardt & Stern 1988; Carley 1992; Harrald et al. 1994; Dekker 
2005).  A key aspect of this interorganizational structural fit is early identification and 
agreement on common goals, and a reliance on coordination through feedback rather than 
coordination via rigid pre-planned responses (Topper & Carley 1999).  The emergence of 
the distributed system develops first from a few pre-planned interorganizational 
relationships, but as other organizations begin to enter the network of responders, the 
interorganizational system’s development is not mandated by some pre-planned response; 
rather its structural form is flexible.  By feedback mechanisms and lateral, informal 
communications, the coordination structure is allowed to emerge and become distributed.  
As the disaster response moves along in time, this interorganizational system is agile 
enough to allow the organizations to effectively begin cooperating with local community 
entities, which is a key performance enhancement finding of Harrald et al. (1994). 
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The preceding sections highlight the debate regarding the effectiveness of 
different coordination mechanisms in achieving high performance in crisis response 
operations where interorganizational systems frequently operate in the face of high 
uncertainty.  It has been shown that knowledge types (e.g., trans-specialist and specialist) 
within an organization produce varying performance results (Nissen et al. 2008).  In this 
dissertation, two types of knowledge, tactic and explicit, are investigated to note their 
effects on performance of interorganizational systems that respond to disaster event.  A 
group of boundary spanners that are highly experienced (i.e., have a high degree of tacit 
knowledge) in responding to crisis events, but thrust into the new role of collaborating in 
a virtual team environment will have performance differences based on the coordination 
mechanism employed to govern the boundary spanning activities (i.e., collaborating to 
produce mutually supporting plans of action—a framework for integrated action).   
• Null Hypothesis H0: In the early stages of crisis response activities, there 
are no performance differences in virtual teams based on different types of 
knowledge resident within the teams and the coordination mechanisms 
used to manage the integration of activities.  
• Hypothesis 1: Virtual team performance with respect to the speed 
of integrating activities will be affected by the knowledge type 
composition of each team interacting with different coordination 
mechanisms. 
• Hypothesis 1a:  Virtual team performance with respect to speed of 
integrating activities will be best (i.e., shortest time to project 
completion) when each team is comprised of individuals with high 
levels of tacit knowledge and operate under a mutual adjustment 
coordination mechanism. 
• Hypothesis 2: Virtual team performance with respect to the 
functional integration risk (i.e., risk to component quality) will be 
affected by the knowledge type composition of each team 
interacting with different coordination mechanisms. 
• Hypothesis 2a:  Virtual team performance with respect to the 
functional integration risk of the planning actions will be best (i.e., 
risk to component quality will be lowest) when each team is 
comprised of individuals with high levels of tacit knowledge and 
operate under a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism. 
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• Hypothesis 3: Virtual team performance with respect to the project 
integration risk will be affected by the knowledge type 
composition of each team interacting with different coordination 
mechanism. 
• Hypothesis 3a:  Virtual team performance with respect to the 
project integration risk will be best (i.e., the quality of the overall 
project based on the integration of components will be lowest) 
when each team is made up of individuals with high levels of tacit 
knowledge and operate under a direct supervision coordination 
mechanism. 
• Hypothesis 4:  Virtual team performance with respect to 
communication risk (i.e., the ratio of missed or mishandled 
communications to the total amount of communications attempted 
between actors) will be affected by the knowledge type 
composition of each team interacting with different coordination 
mechanisms. 
• Hypothesis 4a:  Virtual team performance with respect to 
communication risk will be best (i.e., the ratio of missed or 
mishandled communications to the total amount of 
communications attempted between actors will be lowest) each 
team is made up of individuals with high levels of tacit knowledge 
and operate under a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism.  
B. COMPUTATIONAL ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Computational organization theory seeks to investigate organizational phenomena 
by employing computational tools (e.g., artificial intelligence and mathematical functions 
and relationships) that are grounded in well understood sociological theories such as 
organization theory, information processing theory, and contingency theory (Levitt, Orr 
& Nissen 2005).  Similar to computer aided design and analysis of physical systems (e.g., 
bridges and new aircraft), computational organization theory supports building and 
analyzing executable models of theoretical or physical sociological systems such as 
organizations (e.g., see Carley & Lin 1997; Levitt et al, 1999; Burton & Lauridsen 2002; 
Looney & Nissen 2006).  Those models can also be used to support computational 
experimentation through precise control of the design parameters that are used to build 
each model of the phenomenon: by holding certain design parameters constant while 
varying other select parameters, multiple Monte Carlo simulations are run on these 
executable models thereby enabling researchers to gain valuable insight into organization 
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behaviors (Levitt 2004).  Additionally, these simulation runs can be interrupted to gain 
insight into emergent conditions developing over time (Nissen & Levitt 2004).  This 
research method is apropos to investigate the challenges of interorganizational disaster 
research because it offers the ability to test hypotheses regarding fleeting 
interorganizational relationships prevalent in disasters, and develop new theoretic insights 
of this complex environment. 
Early work in computational modeling of organization behavior is traced to 
Cohen and Cyert (1965).  The development of this method of organization research 
progresses alongside the development of software applications as evident in linear 
programming’s optimization models that emulate pooled interdependencies and also 
critical path method (CPM) models for making explicit the representations of 
sequentially interdependent tasks (Jin & Levitt 1996).  Carley and Prietula (1994) provide 
the foundation for the growth of computational organization theory into development of 
agent-based models (Cohen 1992; Kutz et al. 1999) which attempt to emulate the 
dynamic nature of organization behavior.  The Virtual Design Team (VDT) program 
(VDT 2004) led by Stanford University researchers is an ongoing interdisciplinary 
research effort begun in the late 1980s to develop “new micro-organization theory and 
embedding it in software tools that can be used to design organizations in the same way 
that engineers design bridges, semiconductors or airplanes: through computational 
modeling, analysis, and evaluation of multiple alternate prototype systems.” (Nissen & 
Levitt 2004 p. 172) The following sections present background information on a rich 
computational organization research stream led by Stanford University’s Virtual Design 
Team and the modeling environment that it employs.  
1. Background of Virtual Design Team Research 
The VDT research is based on Galbraith’s (1977) information processing theory 
of organizations, which has as its ontological foundation the belief that organizations are 
information processing entities.  More details into the computational modeling 
environment that VDT and its extension called POW-ER (Projects, Organizations and 
Work for Edge Research—an environment for computational modeling of military 
 49
command and control organizations and processes) employ are discussed in the next 
section.  VDT research moves along two related tracks to meet its aforementioned goals.  
One track is the continuing effort to formalize (i.e., create non-numeric, symbolic) 
representations of well understood yet qualitative (i.e., informal, ambiguous, natural 
language) descriptions of organizational behavior, such as March and Simon’s (1958) 
bounded rationality assumption, Thompson’s (1967) task interdependence contingencies, 
and Galbraith’s (1977) information processing abstraction (Nissen & Levitt 2004).  
“Once formalized through a computational model, the symbolic representation is 
‘executable,’ meaning it can emulate the dynamics of organizational behavior.” (Nissen 
& Levitt 2004 p. 172)  While these symbolic representations are not as precise as the 
continuous variable-based physical science models of phenomena, these computational 
models are “semi-formal (e.g., people viewing the model can agree on what it describes), 
reliable (e.g., the same sets of organizational conditions and environmental factors 
generate the same sets of behaviors), and explicit (e.g., much ambiguity inherent in 
natural language is obviated).” (Nissen & Levitt 2004 p. 172)  A limitation of this semi-
formal modeling is that it must account for the non-deterministic behavior of social 
systems.  There are, however, certain ways to mitigate that limitation, such as the fact 
that differences in individuals tend to average out when aggregated longitudinally or 
cross-sectionally.  For example, workers are occasionally inattentive and make mistakes; 
this can be modeled stochastically to approximate collective behavior (Nissen & Levitt 
2004).  In other areas, various statistical distributions (e.g., normal) are used to account 
for ranges of possible behaviors, and Monte Carlo techniques are used to generate a range 
of expected to rare and exceptional behaviors of the organization model as a whole. 
The other main track of VDT’s research is in validating the modeling 
environment.  Christiansen (1993) and Thomsen (1998) represent “extensive empirical 
validation projects….” (Nissen & Levitt 2004 p. 172)  This effort continues in 
importance as researchers work to formalize additional well accepted micro-
organizational theories and experiences.  Following seminal works by Campbell and 
Stanley (1963) and Cook and Campbell (1976), the research team’s focus is on 
reinforcing face validity (i.e., do the parameters and visual aspect of the model’s 
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representation of the phenomenon make sense to a subject matter expert), construct 
validity (i.e., are the operations of the underlying project elements accurate), internal 
validity (i.e., are only relevant concepts implemented and do they function correctly), and 
external validity (i.e., does the model allow for accurate representation of a variety of 
organizations structures).   
A high degree of both internal and external validity exists in the VDT model.  Its 
strong internal validity stems from extensive systematic testing processes using 
intentionally designed small projects to compare aggregate simulation results with 
contingency theory predictions (Jin & Levitt 1996).  Its highly reputable external validity 
comes from three main modes: (1) emulation of real project teams through numerous 
retrospective case studies (Yin 2003) of diverse projects and organizations (i.e., over 20 
case studies contribute details to enable back-casting calibration of micro-level behaviors 
to produce macro-level outcomes—see Christiansen (1993) and Thomsen et al. (1999)), 
(2) intellective experiments where researchers use the model as a virtual organization test 
bench to explore myriad organization questions and thereby gain new understanding of 
relevant phenomena (e.g., understanding performance effects of geographically 
distributed team members—see Wong & Burton 2000), and (3) cross-model docking 
(Axtel et al. 1996) where a comparison is made between the output of VDT and another 
model that uses a different modeling technique but similar inputs to represent the same 
phenomenon (e.g., docking comparison of ORGAHEAD and SimVision—see Louie et 
al. 2003) (Levitt, Orr & Nissen 2006).   
2. Computational Modeling Environment   
This section draws heavily from Jin & Levitt (1996) and Nissen and Levitt 
(2005).  VDT is designed to explore complex but relatively routine tasks associated with 
many different industrial projects.  In collaboration with Stanford University’s Virtual 
Design Team research project, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Edge Power 
extends VDT into the computational modeling environment called POW-ER, which 
enables research into the military command and control (C2) domain.  These similar 
computational modeling environments are based on the Galbraith’s (1977) information 
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processing theory that an organization processes and communicates information to 
coordinate and control its activities to produce some output (Jin & Levitt 1996).  
Processing and communicating information to achieve some organization goal generally 
requires humans to be involved in the activities.  “These information processors send and 
receive messages along specific lines of communication (e.g., formal lines of authority) 
via communications tools with limited capacity (e.g., memos, voice mail, meetings).” (Jin 
& Levitt 1996)  Table 3 describes the elements that make up the VDT and POW-ER 
computational modeling environment.  
  
Tasks Abstract representations of any work that consumes time, is required for project completion and can generate exceptions.
Actors A person or a group of persons who perform work and process information. 
Exceptions Simulated situations where an actor needs additional information, requires a decision from a supervisor, or discovers an error that needs correcting.
Milestones Points in a project where major business objectives are accomplished, but such markers neither represent tasks nor entail effort.
Successor 
links
Define an order in which tasks and milestones occur in a model, but they do not constrain 
these events to occur in a strict sequence. Tasks can also occur in parallel. These models 
offer three types of successor links: finish-start, start-start and finish-finish.
Rework 
links
Similar to successor links because they connect one task (called the driver  task) with 
another (called the dependent  task). However, rework links also indicate that the dependent 
task depends on the success of the driver task, and that the project's success is also in some 
way dependent on this. If the driver fails, some rework time is added to all dependent tasks 
linked to the driver task by rework links. The volume of rework is then associated with the 
project error probability settings.
Task 
assignments




Show which actors supervise which subordinates. In these models, the supervision structure 
(also called the exception-handling hierarchy ) represents a hierarchy of positions, defining 
who a subordinate would go to for information or to report an exception.
 
Table 3. VDT and POW-ER Model Elements and Element Descriptions (adapted 
from Looney & Nissen 2006) 
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Using those elements and guided by the information-processing theory 
foundation, organizational models are built by modeling the “knowledge work through 
interactions of tasks to be performed, actors communicating with one another and 
performing tasks, and an organizational structure that defines actors’ roles and constrains 
their behaviors.  In essence, this amounts to overlaying the task structure on the 
organization structure and to developing computational agents with various capabilities to 
emulate the behaviors of organizational actors performing work.” (Nissen & Levitt 2004 
p. 173)  An illustration of how these elements interrelate is exhibited in Figure 9.  As 
suggested by the figure, the organization structure models networks of reporting links.  
Those links can capture theoretically described micro-behaviors such as bounded 
rationality (March & Simon 1958) through a manager’s limits on span of control, 
attention span, and empowerment.  Task structures are represented as a separate network 
of activities that define expected work duration, complexity and required skills to 
complete.  Within the organization structure, roles (e.g., manage and planner) can capture 
organization attributes such as skills possessed, level of experience, and task familiarity.  
Within the task structure, various sequencing constraints, interdependencies and rework 
loops are modeled to imbue the organization with considerable variety regarding how 
knowledge work is organized and accomplished. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Information Processing View of Knowledge Work (from Gateau et al. 
2007) 
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As also suggested by the figure, each actor has a queue of information tasks to 
perform (e.g., receiving messages, doing work, and attending meetings) and a queue of 
information outputs (e.g., completed work products, request for assistance, and 
communications to other actors).  The performance of those tasks is affected by, (1) each 
actor’s skill level at performing each task, (2) interruptions that occur which divert the 
actor’s attention, (3) the relative priority that the task is given, and (4) the actor’s backlog 
(i.e., queue length).  A task is constrained by the number of actors assigned to each task, 
the magnitude of the task, and both scheduled (e.g., work breaks and ends of shifts), and 
unscheduled (e.g., awaiting information such as decisions from leaders and inputs from 
actors performing rework) downtime. 
The preceding prose focuses on the ontological foundation of the computational 
modeling environment.  The computational implications of the modeling environment 
involve calculations based on both direct work (e.g., planning and managing) and 
coordination work (e.g., group tasks and joint problem solving) which are modeled as 
work volume.  This construct is used to represent a unit of work (e.g., associated with a 
task, or a meeting) within the task structure.  In addition to symbolic execution of the 
VDT and POW-ER models (e.g., qualitatively assessing the skill mismatches and task 
concurrency challenges) through micro-behaviors derived from organization theory, the 
discrete event simulation engine enables process performance to be assessed (e.g., 
quantitatively projecting task duration, cost, rework, and functional and overall process 
quality).  
This background information sets the stage for Chapter III’s in-depth descriptions 
of the research methods.  Within the research methods chapter, detailed descriptions of 
the parameters used to set up the baseline model and the necessary adjustments to the 
relevant dependent variables are provided.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The literature review summarizes and combines the three main theoretical 
traditions informing this dissertation—structural contingency theory, knowledge flow 
theory, and computational organization design theory.  This chapter presents the research 
design.  The plan for this research is based on a mixed methodology research approach 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998; Kerlinger & Lee 2000; Mingers 2001) where qualitative 
methods (e.g., case study—see Jin 2003, participant observation—see Spradley 1980, and 
grounded theory—see Glaser & Strauss 1967) precede the use of quantitative methods 
(e.g., scientific experimentation—see Shadish, Cook & Campbell 2002).  In this 
dissertation, the plan is to conduct case study research to inform the building of a valid 
baseline agent-based computational organization model, which in turn is the venue for a 
two-factorial computational experiment.  The controlled manipulation of select 
parameters of the baseline computational model are theory driven, and made to support 
testing of the structural contingency theory hypotheses that are articulated in the literature 
review.   
This chapter first discusses the plan for conducting the qualitative research 
necessary to generate a representative computational organizational model of the 
observed phenomenon.  It then presents the analytical method associated with the 
quantitative method, specifically Monte Carlo driven computational experiments that 
supports a two-factorial experiment construct and analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
statistical techniques. 
A. QUALITATIVE METHODS 
The research employs teams of researchers to simultaneously conduct qualitative 
field research at multiple high-level military headquarters during a major military field 
event.  Each headquarters represents a maritime (i.e., naval) component of their 
respective country or standing political/military alliance (e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)).  Each headquarters occupies a similar position in the traditional 
military hierarchy (i.e., chain of command)—see Figure 10.  Each is responsible for 
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similar organizational functions such as coordinating the naval operations for assigned 
forces over a large geographic area of responsibility.  By virtue of having similar military 
and western maritime cultures and traditions, these headquarters have many common 
characteristics, which are discussed in the next chapter.  This degree of homogeneity 
should facilitate similar preparations for the members of the research team employed to 
perform this immersive field research. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Generic Military Hierarchy (* Indicates Focal  
Level for this Research) 
A driving objective agreed to by all of the participating headquarters was to 
explore collaboration between maritime headquarters as they attempted to develop plans 
that not only coordinated the activities of their own subordinate forces, but also achieved 
a high degree of coordination between their forces as they all faced the same emerging 
crisis.  This qualitative fieldwork focuses on answering the following multi-part question:  
How do these organizations collaborate with one another to (1) coordinate problem-
solving activities, (2) coordinate planned actions of subordinate forces, and (3) create 
new knowledge or share existing knowledge? 
Each of these maritime headquarters is structured in a way that closely resembles 
Mintzberg’s machine bureaucracy archetype (see Figure 11); therefore, it is their techno-
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structure that is responsible for planning.  The planning tasks accomplished by the 
techno-structure are designed to develop governing plans that coordinate the activities of 
their operating core.  The participating headquarters each agree that it is their planning 
teams (i.e., techno-structure) that are responsible for developing this internal coordination 
(e.g., detailed plans), and have a primary role in the boundary spanning activities 
necessary to coordinate the activities of each organization’s relevant operating core (e.g., 
tactical military forces).  The unit of analysis in this qualitative phase is the maritime 
headquarters planning team.  This focus is inclusive of the participants, the social 
structure, the goals, and the technology (Leavitt 1965; Scott 2003) of each headquarters’ 
planning team.  This level of analysis allows for the observation of formalized, vertical 
internal coordination mechanisms with emerging external, horizontal coordination 
requirements.  The boundary spanning activities between the participating organizations 
enable this research to investigate organization performance (e.g., degree of coordination 
achieved) at the interorganizational level of analysis. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Generic Maritime Headquarters Depicted as a Machine Bureaucracy  
(adapted from Mintzberg 1979 & Nissen 2005) 
The plan is to conduct this qualitative research following a case study method 
(Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead 1987; Yin 2003).  The situations that these participating 
organizations agreed to explore represent a unique case (Yin 2003).  The participating 
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countries all agree that it is worthwhile to investigate the interorganizational coordinating 
activities enabled by highly connected communications networks when independent 
allied maritime headquarters each respond to the same emerging crisis.  Figure 12 depicts 
each maritime headquarters dispatching a crisis response task force (e.g., a cross-
functional task force assembled from its tactical maritime assets such as surface 
combatants and maritime aviation forces) to the affected area (i.e., crisis) and the 
coordination links between these independent headquarters that are relevant to this 
research.  The participating headquarters each recognize that this type of crisis response 
relationship does happen (e.g., Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and 
disaster relief operations), and they also agree that there is no doctrine or procedures 
written to help them achieve successful interorganizational coordination of activities.   
 
 
Figure 12.   Multiple Independent Responses to a Maritime Crisis  
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From a qualitative research perspective, these participating headquarters also 
recognize that it is impractical to gain embedded access to observe and collect qualitative 
data during actual crisis events because the events are relatively rare, emerge rapidly, and 
there are administrative challenges to gaining embedded access for observers (e.g., 
security access to observe inside of workspaces where nationally classified information is 
used).  Finally, the plan for the design of the scenario that these organizations face 
focuses on a situation that all agree is highly representative (Yin 2003) of a typical 
complex maritime crisis event where each country would likely respond with maritime 
forces. 
1. Data Collection 
The plan for data collection is driven by the desire to obtain data from multiple 
sources.  With multiple sources of data, data triangulation can emerge during analysis.  
Data triangulation entails seeking convergence of multiple sources of evidence on the 
same finding or fact; hence, it enhances the construct validity of the study (Jick 1979; Yin 
2003).  Beyond data triangulation, this study is further enhanced by the convergence of 
multiple perspectives contributed by the individual members of each team of participant 
observers.  This is known as investigator triangulation (Yin 2003), which enhances the 
reliability of the case study. 
a. Preliminary Stage 
The first stage of the data collection plan consists of acquiring archival 
data from the participating organizations.  Archival data that articulates each 
organization’s designed structure and procedures for coordinating the activities of 
subordinates is important to this research because it helps in preparing the data collection 
plan, and helps orient the observers prior to being immersed in the environment for 
ethnographic data collection work (Yin 2003).  This orientation assists in documenting 
actions with some precision (e.g., correct spelling and phrasing).  Additionally, 
architecture diagrams of the existing communications networks are of interest.  The plan 
is to acquire, catalog and review this data prior to the field experiment.  Not only is this 
information useful for developing the collection plan (e.g., surveys and interview 
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instruments), it is informative during the analysis phase because it provides an objective 
source of data that is comparable to the observed structures and procedures from the field 
experiment. 
b. Immersive Field Research Stage  
The second stage of the data collection plan is focused on the participant 
observers (Spradley 1980).  The plan is to have a team that consists of two or three 
observers immerse within each maritime headquarters and act as moderate participants.  
Spradley (1980) describes moderate participants as observers that “loiter” alongside the 
participants, and may use the same systems that the participants use.  These participant 
observers collect ethnographic data such as condensed field notes.  Based on grounded 
theory research techniques, they develop, analyze and interpret their observations to 
facilitate the mapping of the observed processes (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Charmaz & 
Mitchell 2001).  These participant observation techniques go along with the case study 
method requirements to collect documents that the participants use or generate during the 
course of events. 
Finally, the plan is to conduct periodic interviews with key participants 
and administer some survey instruments.  Beyond the rich ethnographic descriptions 
(e.g., grand tour observation), the observers also pay particular attention to examples of 
knowledge flows, both within each organization and between the organizations.  As these 
observations are critical to building the baseline computational model of this crisis 
response planning project, it is important that accurate direct observations of events are 
made (e.g., daily schedules of meetings including the start and end times of activities).  
Coordination within and between the organizations is assessed based 
largely on written products developed by the participants.  The plan for collecting 
documents entails using the observers’ network access to all of the online workspaces 
that the participants use to store and transfer documents.  The observers are to identify the 
relevant documents created throughout the field experiment, and collect and catalog them 
for analysis.  The observers also have to manually copy and catalog any non-online 
written or drawn work for analysis.  All on-line workspaces are archived to support 
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qualitative analysis—this is in addition to the condensed collection of documents that the 
observer teams note as relevant to the within and between group coordination activities. 
Conducting open-ended interviews with key participants are also a part of 
the data collection plan.  Interview instrument development is guided by Rubin and 
Rubin (1995).  Finally, questionnaires are used for additional data collection.  These 
questionnaires collect demographic information as an efficient way (i.e., more efficient 
compared to conducting face-to-face interviews) of documenting the professional 
histories of the participants.  Additionally, some open-ended questionnaires are planned 
to solicit opinions from the participants regarding the events experienced during the field 
experiment.  This data is another piece of potential corroborating evidence for the 
observation data taken by the participant observers. 
2. Qualitative Analysis 
The plan is to analyze the multiple data sources of this case study research 
following the methods described by Yin (2003) and Glaser and Strauss (1967).  Since the 
primary focus of the qualitative phase of this research is to develop a baseline 
computational organizational model, a case description methodology is applicable (Yin 
2003).  To facilitate the development of the baseline model, the key aspects that need to 
emerge from the case study are (1) process steps (i.e., tasks), (2) their associated time 
frames, and (3) the participants (i.e., actors) involved in each step.  This places emphasis 
on developing chronologies (Yin 2003).  The plan is for each team of observers to 
develop a chronology for their organization during the field experiment.  They associate 
their field notes and interview data with these chronologies, especially incorporating 
instances of knowledge flows and any other interesting phenomena that they observe.   
After the field experiment is complete, the plan is for the observer teams to come 
together and build a comprehensive chronology, and conduct pattern matching analysis 
of the phenomena observed based on grounded theory methods (Glaser & Strauss 1967; 
Atkinson et al. 2001; Yin 2003).  During this phase of the analysis, it is important to 
determine where interdependencies (Thompson 1967) exist among the tasks performed.  
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To enhance the determination of interdependencies, a later review of the products 
developed and reworked throughout the chronology is conducted. 
Once those analysis tasks are complete, the chronology and pattern matching 
analysis then compares that with the archival data and other documents collected, 
especially the formal organizational structures and procedures.  Where designed and 
observed tasks, sequences, and actors align, triangulation enhances the construct validity 
of the data going into the baseline computational model development.  Where there are 
differences, between the observed and formalized processes—as is expected—a review 
of the findings by key participants is planned, as well as a face validity check of the 
baseline computational model by select participants.  The comparison and integration of 
these different sources of data help strengthen the construct validity of this phase of the 
research, which is important as this drives the development of the baseline computational 
organizational model.   
B. QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
The baseline computational model is developed using the POW-ER system.2  The 
details of this baseline model are discussed in the next chapter.  This section describes the 
plan for using the model to conduct and analyze the computational experimentation phase 
of this research.  The experiment design and statistical analysis methods planned are 
presented next. 
This hypotheses testing experiment involves a two factorial design—see Table 4.  
The factorial design accounts for manipulating two dichotomous independent variables—
organization coordination mechanism (i.e., direct supervision and mutual adjustment) and 
knowledge type (i.e., tacit and explicit).  The different coordination mechanisms are 
made manifest within the computational model by variations of select design parameters 
(e.g., centralization and matrix strength) and organizational structural relationships (e.g., 
supervisor-subordinate relationships between agents in the POW-ER models).  The 
knowledge-type variables are made manifest by varying application experience and skill 
                                                 
2 POW-ER is modeling environment that is based on nearly two decades of extensive and rigorous 
empirical validation conducted by the Virtual Design Team (VDT) research program established at 
Stanford University —see VDT 2005. 
 63
level assigned to actors in the models, and by variations to the formalization design 
parameter.  The interactive results of these manipulations are measured by the dependent 
organizational performance variables of time, project risk, functional risk, and 
communication risk.  This factorial design is a familiar contingency theory design 
(Donaldson 2001).  A two-way factorial analysis of variance is planned to analyze the 
independent and interactive effects of the independent variables on the dependent 




Direct Supervision Mutual Adjustment 
Tacit 
 
Centralization – Medium 
Matrix Strength - Medium 
Skill Level – High 
Application Experience – High 
Formalization – Low 
 
 
Centralization – Low 
Matrix strength - High 
Skill Level – High 
Application Experience – High 





Centralization – Medium 
Matrix Strength - Medium 
Skill Level – Low 
Application Experience - Low 
Formalization – Medium 
 
 
Centralization – Low 
Matrix Strength - High 
Skill Level – Low 
Application Experience - Low 
Formalization – Medium 
 
Table 4. Factorial Design 
The plan for conducting the computational experiments starts with making select 
modifications to the baseline model’s characteristics.  The baseline model represents one 
of the four quadrants of the two-factorial experiment design.  These select modifications 
are informed by organization design and knowledge flow theories, and the rationale for 
each are discussed in the next chapter.  Once the model for each quadrant is created, the 
computational experiment is conducted using Monte Carlo techniques to simulate 30 
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iterations of the model.  Means and variances are computed for empirically derived 
statistical distributions (Jin & Levitt 1996; Levitt et al. 2005; Nissen et al. 2008).  Each 
hypothesis is tested against a 0.05 level of significance; this assessment is based on the F-
ratio. 
C. SUMMARY 
This research uses a mixed method research design where qualitative methods 
precede and then inform the quantitative methods.  The qualitative phase consists of 
immersive case study field research during a quasi-experiment that is specifically 
designed to set the conditions to view the unique and fleeting phenomenon of interest—
i.e., initial coordination of interorganizational systems performed by boundary spanning 
teams.  Using this qualitative data and analysis, a baseline computational agent-based 
organizational model is created.  That model is used to create other theoretically based 
models that are representative of the interaction conditions within each quadrant of the 
two-factorial research design.  Computational experiments are then run using Monte 
Carlo simulations.  From those results, two-way ANOVA techniques are used to test the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter II. 
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IV. RESEARCH RESULTS 
This chapter first presents the qualitative case study research that informs the 
development of the baseline computational organization model.  The details of the 
baseline model are described followed by the theory-informed manipulations of the 
baseline model to enable the computational experimentation.  The last section of the 
chapter presents the quantitative results of the Monte Carlo simulation driven 
computational experiment, a two-factorial experiment—as described in Chapter III—
using analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical techniques.  
A. CASE STUDY 
The case study involved observing a planning team at each of six independent 
military maritime headquarters.  These headquarters set aside time and personnel to 
explore interorganizational collaboration in a virtual environment (i.e., synchronous and 
asynchronous information exchanges over Internet protocol-based applications and 
networks).3  The military organizations that participated consider themselves 
representative of a Maritime Operations Center (MOC)4—i.e., a senior-level headquarters 
responsible for command and control of the full panoply of maritime assets.   
The case study encompasses activities that took place over an eleven-day period 
where planning teams from these MOCs collaborated with each other while each one 
worked to build a plan of action to respond to a developing crisis scenario.  The eleven 
                                                 
3 The event leveraged the infrastructure (e.g., networks and collaboration applications) of an annual 
multinational military field experiment. 
4 A MOC is a subpart of a maritime headquarters.  Its role is generally similar to an organization’s 
technostructure (Mintzberg 1979): it provides support to the commander (i.e., strategic apex) for planning 
and coordinating operations of the subordinate commanders and their assigned forces (i.e., middle line and 
operating core respectively).  While some expertise from the support staff is typically available as needed 
(e.g., legal advise), the MOC generally does not include the administrative sub-parts of a maritime 
headquarters (e.g., personnel/human resources or training/education functions).  For more details on MOCs, 
see Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  Although 
“MOC” is a U.S. Navy acronym, the other countries and Allied organizations involved in this event agree 
that their participating entities generally meet the U.S. Navy’s definition of a MOC.  The acronym MOC is 
used through the rest of this work to refer to these entities.  
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day field event constituted the single case; however, it is broken down into three separate 
periods, each driven by a unique synthetic crisis scenario (i.e., vignette)—see Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Pilot Study Schedule 
There was an initial two-day familiarization event (Vignette 1), where the 
participants quickly work through their planning process in response to a synthetic crisis 
scenario.  The purpose of this event was to familiarize the participants with: 
• The technology (i.e., collaboration applications available to everyone),  
• Their MOC’s  problem solving process (i.e., the within team process), 
• The concept of coordinating their problem solving activities (i.e., the 
processes) with co-equal MOCs, and  
• The concept of coordinating the problem solving processes’ outputs (i.e., 
plans for the activities of subordinates assigned to each MOC’s 
commander). 
“Day 3” (see Figure 13) began the first of a three-day crisis response problem-
solving vignette.  During those days, each MOC’s planning team worked to develop a 
recommendation to their commander regarding (1) how their subordinates’ activities 
should be coordinated in response to the crisis, and (2) how their subordinate’s activities 
should be coordinated with the activities of the other responding MOCs (i.e., the 
activities of their subordinates).  Figure 12 in the previous chapter depicts this 
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phenomenon of the subordinates from multiple MOC responding to a crisis event.  After 
a non-workday (i.e., Sunday), Day 7 began as an out-briefing day.  On this day, each 
MOC briefed its plan to its commander.  These briefings were conducted separately so 
that there was no exchange of information between the teams.  Day 8 began another 
three-day crisis response problem-solving vignette, Vignette 3, which was followed on 
day four with the final out-briefing to the commander.  Of note, no non-workday was 
interspersed in this last vignette. 
1. Participants 
The participants in the case study consisted of military personnel that were 
assigned to one of the six participating MOCs.  Each participant was either a full-time or 
part-time (i.e., collateral duty) member of his or her MOC’s team of planners.  Of the six 
MOCs, there were three different countries and a multi-national alliance represented.  
The participants all shared English as a common language, but for some of the 
participants at MOC5 and MOC6, that common language was not their first language.  
Throughout this document, the MOCs are generally referred to as: 
• “MOC1” from Country A  
• “MOC2” from Country A  
• “MOC3” from Country B  
• “MOC4” from Country C 
• “MOC5” from Multi-national Alliance D 
• “MOC6” from Multi-national Alliance D  
Each MOC had a commander, a planning team leader, and at least a six member 
planning team.  Of the 38 participants that provided anonymous demographic data, 81% 
reported having more than 15 years of military service.  Based on the demographics and 
observer reports, none of the participants had less than five years of service.  Over 60% 
of the demographic survey respondents reported that they had attended a formal planning 
course, and each MOC had at least one participant with significant planning experience.  
Based on observer reports, four of the six MOCs (MOC2, MOC3, MOC5 and MOC6) 
were made up a cohesive team of planners that routinely worked together.  Of note, these 
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figures exclude data about each MOC’s commander: their position as a senior military 
decision-maker at a MOC is generally predicated on their years of knowledge and 
experience at decision-making, so they are not required to have detailed knowledge of the 
planning process.  
The commanders (“Cdr”) were not part of the daily planning activities nor the 
MOC-to-MOC collaboration, but they were available to receive daily updates, make 
decisions, and provide guidance regarding the mission and forces assigned.  The planning 
team leaders, hereafter referred to as “Plan Managers,” all had attended a formal planning 
course and had expertise at planning and managing planning activities of an operational 
planning team (“OPT”).  Of note, none of them considered themselves experienced in 
synchronous collaborative crisis response planning activities with another co-equal 
headquarters. 5   
Each MOC was staffed by a team of cross-functional personnel (e.g., personnel 
with different specialization areas such as surface ship, maritime aviation, or medical 
operations).  The teams generally consisted of between six and eight planners that were 
actively involved in tasks related to developing the planning products and collaborating 
with other MOCs.  Four of the six MOCs contributed an experienced team of planners 
(i.e., worked together on planning projects as their primary duty, and had formal training 
in their planning process) to the field event.  The other two MOCs (MOC1 and MOC4) 
contributed participants that generally had not worked together on planning projects as a 
primary duty.  Of note, the participants were subject to the influences of real-world 
events, so on any given day, the number of active participants could have be different and 
in some cases, the same peopled did not participate in all of the vignettes.  
2. Case Study Environment  
The observations took place in six different locations, four in Europe and two in 
North America.  The participants at each MOC operated from within their respective 
headquarters location (i.e., similar to a corporation’s divisional headquarters).  From 
                                                 
5 Actors, such as “Cdr,” are represented in this document in quotes to readily distinguish them from 
the task names and abbreviations that are distinguishable by starting with capital letters. 
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those locations, the participants had access to the equipment, people, and information 
sources that they wished to draw upon to support their work tasks.  One notable 
difference existed from the way that these organizations generally operate during a 
developing crisis: the participating organizations limited their participants to an eight-
hour workday during these vignettes, whereas during an actual crisis event, these 
organizations would likely implement extended work hours and adjust schedules to 
maximize the time available for planning. 
Since the MOCs were physically separated, no face-to-face communications 
between the participants at different MOCs took place; therefore, knowledge flow 
activities between MOCs required virtual communications channels.  During this case 
study, the communications channels were supported by a variety of electronic 
communications technologies (e.g., virtual meeting applications, web-based information 
exchange portals, email and telephone, etc.).  The idea behind having a wide variety of 
communications media available to the participants was to not unduly influence or give a 
communications media familiarity advantage to any one MOC.  In other words, each 
MOC was allowed to explore and select the specific channel or channels to use while 
simultaneously developing the procedures for how they would attempt to create 
coordination among their plans. 
Four of the six MOCs worked out of their traditional work areas that were 
designed to support planning activities.  Of the remaining two MOCs, MOC3 worked out 
of a classroom that was temporarily set up to support planning.  It was located in a 
building adjacent to their normal office spaces due to communications network access 
restrictions imposed within their normal offices building.  MOC4’s participants worked 
out of a conference room away from their normal planning workspaces because of 
concerns over having the OPT participants working on a synthetic crisis event while 
working alongside other personnel handling real-world operation.  The only difficulty of 
this arrangement was that MOC4’s “OPT” participants did not have computer network 
connectivity from within their conference room work area.  This required them to leave 
their workspace to conduct synchronous collaborations or post and download 
asynchronous collaborations at a dedicated workstation elsewhere in the building. 
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In general, the planning workspaces had computers, telephones, and network 
access.  Additionally, each workspace had either whiteboard or butcher-block paper 
available for internal planning activities and space where the entire planning team could 
gather around for group face-to-face meetings. 
3. Conduct of the Case Study  
Three vignettes were conducted over the course of this case study.  Each vignette 
provided the MOCs a trigger event to initiate their respective crisis action planning 
process.  This trigger came in the form of a warning order from each MOC’s higher 
headquarters and a common scene-setter information package describing details of the 
synthetic developing crisis.6  The warning orders were very similar, but not exactly the 
same.  Table 5 provides information about these trigger events. 
 
Table 5. Theme of Vignettes 
a. Vignette 1: Practice and Piracy Problem  
As described in Chapter III, Vignette 1 was a brief crisis planning to give 
the participants the opportunity to practice using the various information technologies 
tools available to them (e.g., telephone conference calling, video teleconference, 
asynchronous file sharing and bulletin board applications, and robust online meeting 
applications with synchronous application and screen sharing, text and audio chat, and 
whiteboard functions) come to understand this idea of synchronous collaborative 
                                                 
6 A multi-national team of military and government contractors with real world planning and training 
expertise developed the vignettes and worked as field event controllers (commonly referred to in military 
exercises as “White Cell” or “Exercise Control”) to provide participants realistic, dynamic sources of 
external information (e.g., if a participant had a question to ask of a higher headquarters or subordinate 
command, the controllers would provide realistic feedback).  During the conduct of this case study, the 
team was headed up by an active duty military flag officer with extensive multinational experience.  
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planning among co-equal maritime headquarters.  The participants were told that they 
should de-emphasize the quality of the products produced during this vignette in lieu of 
getting through all phases of the planning process and building familiarity with the 
various information technologies available. 
In general, the participants worked quickly through each step of the 
planning process to build a plan that would put their available military forces into a 
position to thwart an outbreak of piracy on the high seas.  Intra-MOC collaboration was 
common, but there were few instances where, during the course of planning, any inter-
MOC collaboration took place until the end when each MOC’s “Plan Manager” presented 
its plan.  In essence, this was independent teams, each with insufficient resources, 
working on their own solution to the same problem, and then comparing those solutions 
near the end of the planning process.  At that comparison point, it was assessed that one 
grouping of MOCs had come up with three separate levels of military plans.  One MOC 
developed a very high-level strategic description of guidance and broad objectives that its 
forces should adhere to while countering the piracy situation.  Another MOC developed a 
very tactical plan that essentially advised subordinates on how to take actions to stop 
individual pirate attacks, and what actions should be avoided.  The third MOC developed 
a more operational-level plan to allow for sustained and focused operations of its forces 
and intermediate objectives that those forces should be seeking to accomplish.  When 
these three different plans were shared by the participants at the end of Vignette 1, it was 
apparent to the participants and the observers that while three planning products were 
produced, they only fit together under a levels of operations construct (i.e., strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of operations).  The products did not appear to fit what the 
participants or the observers would agree were mutually supporting plans.   
Through discussion amongst the “Plan Managers,” the observers were able 
to note that there was general agreement that periodic collaborations needed to occur 
throughout the planning process.  The “Plan Managers” agreed to conduct a collaboration 
meeting early during Vignette 2 to discuss milestones where the planning products being 
developed could be compared and refined in an effort to achieve a coordinated set of  
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individual plans.  The exercise control team also provided guidance that these plans 
should represent an operational-level focus instead of the more abstract strategic level or 
the overly specific tactical level. 
b. Vignette 2: Terrorism Threat to an International Event Held in a 
Archipelagic Environment 
The idea for the themes behind this particular vignette came about from 
the desire to use real-world, unclassified, and accessible data for the planners to draw 
upon when assessing the situation.  A major World Cup sports tournament (e.g., Soccer 
World Cup) was scheduled during the exact time that this field event was scheduled.  It 
also happened to occur on a variety of islands in a part of the world that was of national 
interest to three of the nations whose MOCs were participating, MOC1, MOC3 and 
MOC4 (note: only MOC3 represents a cohesive team of experienced planners).  With a 
few embellishments (e.g., reporting that high level dignitaries from each country were 
visiting, and that most teams would be ferried to their different island matches) and 
disclosing synthetic intelligence assessments that certain terrorist groups were seeking to 
conduct attacks against teams and dignitaries, this set the stage for a robust maritime 
mission.  The short notice mission was to assist the host nations with the protection of 
participants, dignitaries and spectators in the maritime environment (e.g., protect ferries 
shuttling people).  Furthermore, if required, plan for evacuation of nationals from the 
three countries whose MOCs were participating.  That mission is traditionally called non-
combatant evacuation operations (NEO).  This vignette and its three MOCs constitute 
Vignette 2A.   
Since the other three participating MOCs did not traditionally operate in 
the aforementioned area of the world as the sporting event, details from a recently 
completed international political summit were harvested from news accounts and some 
experts that had participated in the security operations for the event.  This summit 
occurred in an archipelagic area that was of interest to these other three MOCs, MOC2, 
MOC5 and MOC6.  Similar to the preceding descriptions, some facts behind the real 
event were embellished and select synthetic disclosures were made to create a similar set  
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of missions for which these MOCs were to develop plan.  This vignette and its three 
cohesive and experienced MOCs constitute Vignette 2B—the primary event for 
establishing the baseline computational model. 
A lead MOC was designated for Vignette 2B.  This lead MOC gave 
directions for each MOC to conduct a mission analysis and then a mission analysis 
coordination meeting would take place using one of the collaboration applications.  Each 
MOC joined this collaboration session with most all of their respective OPT members 
sitting in on the conversations.  One of the MOCs (note: not the lead MOC) presented a 
highly detailed and complete mission analysis product and various discussions emerged 
to refine and clarify parts of this product.  After the discussions concluded and each MOC 
had an appreciation of the similarities and what differences existed between their 
products, and more importantly why those differences could not be reconciled, the lead 
MOC’s “Plans Manager” stated his opinion that the time that it took to conduct this 
meeting was not conducive to achieving future milestones on the way to the planning 
deadline on the third day of this event.  The other two MOC “Plans Managers,” in a 
separate discussion disagreed with the lead MOC’s assessment, stating that they felt the 
Mission Analysis Coordination meeting was very productive and truly a new and 
unexpected form of interorganizational collaboration.  The opinion of these two non-lead 
MOC “Plans Managers” did not get reported back to the lead MOC. 
The lead MOC “Plans Manager” proceeded to divvy up the work tasks for 
the next phases of the planning process and have each MOC report only its designated 
products to the inter-MOC planning coordination meetings.  No other rich, all-participant 
idea exchanges occurred during subsequent coordination meetings, as the lead MOC took 
the posted products and essentially built a lead-MOC plan that would achieve a high 
degree of interorganizational coordination.  In organization theory terms, the lead MOC 
was attempting to standardize the outputs: achieve coordination by building one common 
plan for all to use.  While this ran askew to the intent of the field experiment and 
directions (i.e., each MOC was to develop its own unique plan) given to the participants 
at the beginning, an overriding theme of the field event was to not impinge on how the 
participants accomplished coordination.  In fact, one of the non-lead MOCs in Vignette 
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2B adhered to the intent that it should have its own country unique plan to present to its 
commander.  This essentially led to two of the three MOCs having a very similar plan, 
and the third MOC having some differences that were largely unbeknownst to the other 
two.   
In the other grouping of MOCs that constituted Vignette 2A, there was no 
designated lead MOC at the start; however, a leader emerged after the Mission Analysis 
coordination phase.  This mutually agreed upon leader did not dictate processes or 
standardization of inputs, processes or outputs, rather it appeared that this leadership role 
served two purposes, 1) to alleviate the discussions regarding when products and 
coordination meetings should occur, and 2) perhaps adjudicate any potential 
disagreements that might emerge in the future.  Similar to the other grouping of MOCs, 
this grouping conducted a Mission Analysis Coordination meeting after completing each 
one’s internal analysis of the mission at hand.  There were many discussions, 
refinements, and agreements to disagree over the mission details.  Throughout the 
vignette, the discussions and disagreements remained very civil, with the appearance that 
each MOC appreciated the co-equal status of the other MOCs in the group. 
During the conduct of this vignette, the leader of the highly experienced 
MOC shared with the other MOCs that one of the “OPT” members had actually called an 
official event security person to gain unclassified insight into how his nation was actually 
poised to handle security issues at the event.  This was a prime example of sharing tacit 
knowledge, albeit in an explicit form.  Through the course of this vignette, many 
discussions emerged between MOC “Plans Managers.”  During these discussions, they 
shared reasons and mental models regarding how elements of their planning products 
were developed.  At one point, a “Plans Manager” stopped looking at another MOC’s 
planning briefing in order to concentrate on the other “Plans Manager’s” words.  When 
asked, he said that it was more important for him to understand the meaning behind the 
presentation then to simply digest the few words and diagrams that showed up on the 
power point slides. 
The final interesting activity that occurred during this group’s planning 
regarded the development of multiple courses of action.  The agreed upon lead MOC 
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directed that each MOC produce one course of action to bring to a combined analysis 
session the next day.  When the next day arrived, the lead MOC began discussing with 
one of the MOCs that their two courses of action were very similar and would not likely 
yield much of a comparison during the analysis and decision phase.  The third MOC of 
the group had not pre-disclosed it course of action in the file sharing application, so there 
was some angst emerging from the lead MOC that the next phase could have problems.  
Once the third MOC entered the collaborative course of action analysis session, it was 
apparent that all would be well because that MOC’s “Plans Manager” ignored the 
leader’s direction to create one course of action and had his “OPT” follow their own 
planning process policies and create multiple, different courses of action.  This work by 
the third MOC certainly facilitated a collaborative analysis of multiple courses of action, 
which provided each MOC with more confidence for making recommendations to their 
commander regarding the merits of each course of action.  
Through discussions with the participants after this vignette, the 
participants agreed that, to their surprise, mutual adjustment seemed to work quite well.  
The only drawback was that it appeared to be “quite chatty.”  The observes took this to 
mean that discussions sometimes strayed off the point and sometimes went on longer 
than was generally regarded as typical in a fast-paced, crisis planning event. 
c. Vignette 3: Containing a Pandemic in a Archipelagic 
Environment 
The grouping of MOCs from Vignettes 2A and 2B remain the same for 
Vignettes 3A and 3B.  Both of the groupings of MOCs received the exact same scenario 
since the focal archipelagic environment for this crisis was in or very near each MOC’s 
area of interest.  The three driving factors of this scenario were to develop plans to 
contain the spread of an emerging pandemic disease via restricting boat travel (e.g., set 
up and monitor a maritime exclusion zone), facilitate humanitarian assistance, and protect 
all forces from contracting the disease.  Similar to the other vignettes, no one MOC had 
enough assets to effectively do this mission alone.   
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For Vignette 3A, the “Plans Manager” for the designated lead MOC, 
stated up front that because he recognized the co-equal status of each MOC, he did not 
intend to be very directive towards the other MOCs during the planning process.  Both of 
the other MOCs’ “Plans Managers” responded by saying that they disagreed and 
expected the lead MOC to be directive.  This was the same grouping of MOCs that 
operated without a designated lead MOC in Vignette 2A.  Soon after the Mission 
Analysis Coordination event completed, a real-world crisis event emerged for one of the 
MOCs.  This required it to withdrawal its participants from the field event.  In lieu of 
their participation, a single planner from the same country who happened to be operating 
in a support role in the exercise control cell picked up the planning duties to allow for 
continued three party collaborative coordination session to continue for the remaining 
two days of the vignette.  His role was less about building planning products, and more 
about providing that third country perspective and planning expertise during coordination 
sessions. 
Throughout the course of Vignette 3A, intra-MOC processes and inter-
MOC collaborations appeared to operate similarly to the previous vignette.  Some of the 
dialog between the MOCs was assessed to have a bit more sternness in tone during 
disagreements over details.  It appeared that the two non-lead MOCs worked together to 
try and move the lead MOC’s “Plan Manager” off of certain details, especially during the 
course of action analysis phase.  Ultimately, a compromise was either reached, or all 
parties at least had a fairly clear understanding of the differences in each MOC’s plans, 
and more importantly the rationale behind the differences.  
The other grouping of MOCs constituted Vignette 3B.  They seemed to 
suffer from the experiences that occurred during Vignette 2B where early highly 
collaborative work sessions were dismissed by the lead MOC as being too time 
consuming and not of great value.  Again, although two MOCs did not share that opinion, 
one of them resigned itself to working its internal processes and only sharing what was 
asked for and not gaining much from the lead MOC’s attempt to standardized the outputs 
(i.e., a common plan for all to submit).  In Vignette 3B, however, where disagreements 
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occurred, such as what the center of gravity7 was for the crisis (e.g., what is the most 
powerful item working against your mission success), these disagreements were not 
dwelt upon; rather they were noted in each MOC’s plan so that each commander could be 
aware that there was some item that remained uncoordinated.   
In general, there was no real consensus opinion to emerge from this 
grouping of MOCs regarding which was the preferred way for co-equal MOCs to achieve 
coordination in plans.  Two of these three MOCs were of the opinion that there was 
efficacy in both the no-lead situation and the designated lead situation.  While one MOC 
was adamant that the designated lead MOC situation was not conducive to achieving 
coordination among co-equal MOCs during collaborative planning. 
4. Process Details 
Archival research of each MOC’s planning doctrine shows strong similarity of the 
general steps involved.  MOC4, MOC5 and MOC6 have identical process steps, while 
MOC1 and MOC2’s identical process steps are very similar to MOC3’s.  Table 6 
juxtaposes these doctrinal processes.  Field observations strongly support the idea that 
these processes and the products associated with the process steps correspond well.  This 
correspondence leads to a generalization that the process can be grouped into four phases; 
Mission Analysis, Course of Action (COA) Development, COA Analysis, and COA 
Decision.  These phases are discussed next.  
 
                                                 
7 Center of Gravity is a term coined by the Clausewitz, an eminent military scholar.  It is a concept 
typically used to assess vital power possessed by friendly forces and vital power being wielded by an 
enemy during a clash of wills. 
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Table 6. Comparison of Various Planning Processes 
a. Phase One – Mission Analysis  
The first generalizable phase of the planning process is Mission Analysis. 
Participants review and analyze warning orders and the situation provided, as well as the 
current situation based on the MOC’s real-world operations.  The purpose of this phase is 
to promote a general common understanding among all members within an “OPT.”  
Specifically, the “OPT” needs to frame the problem in terms of task to be accomplished 
to successfully accomplish the assigned mission contained in the warning order.  The 
common understanding also includes any limitations to possible actions that they might 
choose from, such as treaty requirements or rules of engagement.  This phase consisted 
primarily of each “OPT” conducting an independent task to develop the mission analysis 
product—i.e., a PowerPoint briefing.  This was followed by an internal face-to-face 
meeting between the “Plan Manager” and the “OPT.”  This allowed the “Plan Managers” 
to provide feedback to their “OPT” to refine the mission analysis product.  It also gave 
the “Plan Managers” a product, which they put forward as an entering position for a 
collaborative coordination session with the other MOC “Plan Managers.” 
This collaborative mission analysis session with other MOCs was not 
reflected in any of the planning doctrines that governed the activities of these MOCs.  
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After Vignette 1, it appeared to the observers and was confirmed in interviews that the 
“Plan Managers” came to the realization that completely independent (i.e., no 
collaboration between MOCs during planning) planning based on a common mission and 
situation did not produce a very well coordinated set of COAs to be enacted by each 
MOC’s subordinates.  What emerged for Vignettes 2 and 3 was a preliminary discussion 
among the “Plan Managers” about the general timeline that the planning process should 
take including times when collaborative sessions to compare and coordinate intermediate 
products would take place.  A mission analysis coordination meeting between “Plan 
Managers” emerged as a new step in the planning process.  It was scheduled and 
completed prior to the traditional last step of the planning process—the commander’s 
mission analysis decision step.  Both the mission analysis coordination and mission 
analysis decision task provide additional feedback to refine the mission analysis product. 
b. COA Development 
COA Development is the second phase.  It does not officially begin until 
the commander approves the mission analysis product and provides planning guidance.  
The primary task of this phase involves the “OPT” sketching out in words and pictures 
possible ways to sequence activities to accomplish the mission.  Once the “OPT” has 
developed a draft version of each COA, the “Plan Managers” meet with the “OPT” to 
review these products and provide feedback.  These COAs are then used as basis for a 
coordination session between the “Plan Managers.”  This event is similar to the 
coordination session used during the mission analysis phase.  The inter-MOC COA 
coordination session was followed by each MOC “Cdr’s” review of their MOC’s 
developed COA drafts.  During this task, the commander provides feedback and guidance 
regarding which COAs to analyze during the next phase.   
c. COA Analysis 
COA Analysis is the third general phase of the MOC planning process.  
The major tasks of this phase include the “OPT” conducting an analysis of each COA by 
basically describing in detail what each functional area activity is being performed, where 
and when in space and time, and which subordinates are performing those activities.  This 
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is done using words and diagrams to mentally walk through a COA to refine its level of 
details and coordination among those details.  Generally, the activities proposed are 
challenged by some member of the “OPT” that is asked to raise potential environmental 
(e.g., bad weather) or adversary (e.g., attacks) challenges.  This task covers many details.  
Upon completion of the COA analysis, the “OPTs” formulate their respective 
recommendation regarding which COA best meets the “Cdr’s” mission and guidance.  
During this task, the “OPT” makes estimates of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
proposed COA.  With these two tasks complete, the “OPTs” met with their respective 
“Plan Manager” to refine the products. 
d. COA Recommendation 
The “Plan Managers” then took element of their analysis and estimate 
products to a virtual coordination session with the each other.  This session led to final 
refinement of each MOC’s COA analysis phase products.  This phase and the overall 
project finished with each “Cdr” independently reviewing the COAs and staff estimates, 
and ultimately approving one of the COAs. 
B. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
This section describes the computational modeling done to support this research.  
The first section outlines the baseline model design and parameters which are based on 
the qualitative research phase.  It then reports the performance results from simulation 
runs of the baseline model.  The next section describes the design and parameter changes 
to the baseline model to instantiate a model that can represent the performance outputs 
for each of the remaining cells in the two-factorial research design. 
1. Baseline MOC-to-MOC Collaborative Planning Process Model  
Figure 14 is a screen capture of the POW-ER model for the MOC-to-MOC 
collaborative planning process that takes place during the initial phase of an operation 
other than war crisis situation (e.g., humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations) 
that calls for maritime assets from multiple countries to respond.  The project entails 
three co-equal (i.e., each is responsible for preparing a course of action plan for its own 
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assets) teams of planners working through their crisis action planning process to produce 
a decision briefing for their respective commanders.  The observations point to a baseline 
model where the direct supervision and high tacit knowledge conditions exist. 
The project tasks are represented in Figure 14 by yellow rectangular boxes.  Pale 
yellow (light shaded box if viewing in black and white) boxes represent the tasks that are 
performed by each organization’s commander (e.g., Cdr A).  Yellow (medium shaded) 
boxes are tasks performed by each organization’s plan managers (e.g., Plan Mgr B).  
Dark yellow (dark shaded) boxes are tasks performed by the respective operational 
planning teams (e.g., OPT C).  A blue (light) colored one-way arrow connects actors to a 
task that they perform.   
Black one-way arrows connect to the sides of task boxes represent the flow of 
work over the course of the project.  Red arrows (one-way arrows that connect task boxes 
from the upper side) represent rework links.  Rework links are important to account for 
exceptions or problems that occur during a task that compels rework of a related task to 
occur.  Green arrows (two-way arrows that connect task boxes at the bottom side) 
represent reciprocally interdependent tasks where it is important for informal 
communications to occur.  
Finally, a blue hexagon represents a milestone in the process flow of tasks.  
Milestones act to ensure that all predecessor tasks are complete before any of the next set 
of tasks can begin.  Milestones in the diagram also help the reader perceive the start and 
completion of project phases.  Table 7 shows a legend to assist the reader in 
understanding the POW-ER model screen capture. 
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Table 7. POW-ER model legend 
The project has four phases: (1) mission analysis, (2) course of action 
development (COA Dev), (3) course of action analysis (COA Analysis), and (4) course of 
action decision (COA Decision).  To make the POW-ER model easier to view, each 
MOC’s tasks stack on top of one another; in other words there are three layers of similar 
task boxes (e.g., Plan Prep C is in the foreground and partially covering the Plan Prep A 
and Plan Prep B task boxes).  The only connections between the three layers are the green 
communications links that connect similar task boxes between each MOC’s processes. 
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Figure 14.   POW-ER Baseline Model of Direct Supervision Coordination Mechanism 
for Planning in an Interorganization System 
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a. Mission Analysis  
The mission analysis phase includes tasks for the “Plan Mgrs” and 
“OPTs.”  The “Cdr” actors do not have a direct task in this phase until the very end where 
they receive the mission analysis briefing, review it, provide feedback, and ultimately 
approve it.  The “Cdrs” certainly work throughout the project, but they are instantiated in 
the model with only a 0.15 full time equivalent (FTE) setting, which translates into these 
actors only being available for the interaction with the planning process for around an 
hour each day.  This matches the general observations throughout the vignettes where the 
“Cdrs” received briefings and gave guidance necessary for revisions and initiation of the 
next phase of the planning process. 
The mission analysis tasks for the “Plan Mgrs” include: (1) planning 
preparation (Plan Prep), (2) planning coordination (Plan Coord), and (3) plans 
management (Plans Mgt).  During Plan Prep, the “Plan Mgrs” read tasking messages, 
gather initial awareness of the operating environment, and formulate their initial ideas 
regarding the mission and how to execute the planning process (e.g., stipulating product 
deliverables and individuals or teams to prepare the products).  In light of the common 
goal to collaborate with other MOCs to build coordination among the plans, the “Plan 
Mgrs” also have a short initial Plan Coord task where the designated leader shares his or 
her thoughts and directions with the other “Plan Mgrs.”  These tasks are connected by 
green (light) bi-directional communications links (i.e., two-way green arrow connecting 
tasks) that signify a high level of communications needs to happen between these 
reciprocally interdependent tasks.  Even though there is a leader that can designate when 
and what collaboration happens during the project, the other “Plan Mgrs” still represent 
co-equal MOCs that have a foremost responsibility to meet their commander’s unique 
requirements.  Hence, the process and products that these other two MOCs execute and 
develop are reciprocally interdependent with the designated lead MOC.  Finally, the 
“Plan Mgrs” each have a Plans Mgt task which accounts for a steady workload that is 




“inbox” is never empty (e.g., other plans need updating and daily situation briefings and 
policy meetings take up time).  This task allows the “Plan Mgrs” to be modeled with an 
FTE of 1.0. 
The “OPTs” have the primary task in each but the last phase of the project.  
They are responsible for performing the Mission Analysis activities that populate a 
briefing to their “Cdr.”  While there are many sub-parts within this task (e.g., Task 
Analysis, Priority Information Requests, etc.), it is sufficient for this research to represent 
mission analysis as a single task being performed by each “OPT.”  Due to the nature of 
the many sub-parts involved in this task (e.g., one doctrinal publication lists as many as 
17 different processes to accomplish in mission analysis), the requirements complexity 
setting for this task is “high.”  Of note, there are no green communications links between 
these tasks because the teams performed these tasks generally without any substantive 
communications between “OPTs.”  Time is spent after completion of Mission Analysis in 
a meeting to review an “OPT’s” product with their “Plan Mgr” before the product could 
be shared with another MOC.  While a meeting is able to be represented in POW-ER, it 
has a significant impact on POW-ER outputs, especially relating to the coordination that 
occurs through communication in POW-ER.  Since a meeting is designed in POW-ER to 
represent face-to-face communications, this could only affect coordination internal to a 
MOC, but that affect would add to overall project coordination and be unnecessarily 
reflected in the dependent variable project risk.  To account for the time where internal 
MOC meetings occur, a lag time is added to the successor link (i.e., the black (dark) uni-
directional arrow connecting two tasks) that emanates from the project milestone 
(hexagonal blue box) named MA Internal.  If a meeting takes 90 minutes, a “lag of 1.5” is 
added to the successor link, which causes the next task to start after 1.5 hours.  Time 
spent in meetings is accounted for in the “OPTs’” other task of Staff Work.  Staff Work is 
similar to the “Plan Mgrs’” Plan Mgt task discussed in the preceding paragraph: it 
accounts for other daily activities that the OPT members perform (e.g., replying to 
correspondence such as electronic mail). 
The Mission Analysis Coordination (MA Coord) task is the responsibility 
of the “Plan Mgr.”  This task involves the “Plan Mgrs” collaborating in a synchronous 
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mode (e.g., telephone conference call or online meeting application) to review, discuss, 
and coordinate relevant details of their individual mission analysis products.  This virtual 
collaboration event is modeled similarly to the Plan Coord task discussed above, where 
three MA Coord tasks are connected by green communications links signifying the 
intensity of communications between these reciprocally interdependent tasks.  The 
significant difference between this task and both the Plan Coord and Mission Analysis 
tasks is that the MA Coord task’s solution complexity is set to “high” because this task 
accounts for the majority of project coordination that occurs between the MOCs.  Also, 
because a majority of the products within Mission Analysis are reviewed, the 
requirement complexity is set to “high.”  Finally, MA Coordination generates rework, 
signified by uni-directional red links (i.e., one-way red arrow connecting tasks).  When 
an exception occurs in this task, rework is generated for the preceding Mission Analysis 
task.  In other words, as the “Plan Mgrs” discuss and coordinate their respective Mission 
Analysis products, omissions, errors or new ideas could cause the “OPT” to modify 
aspects of its Mission Analysis product. 
The final task of this mission analysis phase is the Mission Analysis 
Decision (MA Decision) by the “Cdr.” This is briefly discussed in this section’s first 
paragraph.  During this task, any exceptions generate rework for the preceding tasks of 
the “Plan Mgr’s” MA Coord and the “OPT’s” Mission Analysis.  Upon the “Cdr’s” 
approval of the mission analysis, the “OPT” begins the COA Development phase. 
b. COA Development 
During the COA Dev task, the “OPTs” devise general activities for their 
available forces (i.e., those that they are authorized to plan for) to perform.  Typically two 
or three different COAs are sketched out.  The goal of this task is to articulate at least one 
feasible way to accomplish the mission.  Once the requisite number of COAs are 
finished, there is again an internal review or meeting with of the “OPT” and the “Plan 
Mgr.”  This meeting is represented by a 1.0 hour lag in the sequence link between the 
milestone COA Dev Internal and the subsequent COA Coord task. 
 87
The COA Coord task is another synchronous virtual collaboration session 
to discuss the COAs that each MOC develops.  The scope of this task does not involve 
the level of details that occur during the MA Coord task.  Hence, it has no special task 
setting and is one of the tasks with the shortest effort assigned at 0.5 hours.  Exceptions 
generated during this task cause rework to the “OPT’s” COA Dev task. 
The final task of the COA Development phase is the “Cdr’s” COA Check.  
This review of the COAs developed elicits feedback from the “Cdr” regarding any 
modifications desired to the COAs and which COAs to carry forward into the COA 
Analysis phase.  The feedback generates rework for both the “Plan Mgr’s” COA Coord 
and “OPT’s” COA Dev tasks.  
c. COA Analysis 
The “OPT” has two tasks associated with this phase, the COA Analysis 
task and the Staff Estimate task.  The COA Analysis task is another example of a 
complex task because of the amount of internal requirements to satisfy.  Each functional 
area (e.g., logistics, civil engineering, and force protection) of maritime operations is 
considered as the participants are led through a facilitated dynamic simulation (e.g., a 
two-sided game model) of the sequence of activities arranged in a COA.  The task 
generally considers activities played out against dynamic external variables such as 
weather and other social systems (e.g., refugees and terrorist groups).  This tasks helps 
ensure that activities are synchronized and all types of capabilities resident in the 
maritime force are considered.  Since maritime assets typically have a wide range of 
capabilities (i.e., are multi-mission capable), this analysis task’s requirement complexity 
characteristic is set to “high.”  Exceptions that occur in this analysis task generate rework 
in the COA Dev task. 
The “OPT’s” Staff Estimate task requires the actors to consider the 
functional areas investigated during the previous COA Analysis task.  This consideration 




objective evaluation is developed and forwarded along with the its associated COAs to 
the “Plan Mgr” for coordination with the other MOCs in the Plan Recommendation task, 
and finally on to the “Cdr’s” COA Decision task. 
The Plan Recommendation task is the final synchronization task between 
the MOCs.  Again, it is conducted after an internal meeting involving the “OPT” and 
“Plan Mgr,” which is modeled as a 1.0 hour lag in the successor link following the COA 
Analysis Internal milestone hexagonal box.  The Plan Recommendation task is conducted 
in a synchronous virtual collaboration session where details of multiple COAs along with 
the staff estimates, specifically those that are being recommended to a Cdr, are reviewed 
and refined as necessary.  Due to myriad details and contribution to project coordination 
considered in this task, both the requirement complexity and solution complexity are set to 
“high.”  Exceptions occurring in this task generate rework in the COA Analysis task. 
The final task in the process is the “Cdr’s” COA Decision task.  The “Cdr” 
takes the input for this task from the output of the “Plan Mgr’s” Plan Recommendation 
task.  Exceptions occurring in this task generate rework for both the Plan 
Recommendation and COA Analysis tasks.  Once complete, this concludes the planning 
project, which is designed to formulate guidance that would be delivered to subordinate 
assets of a MOC as they commence the actual operations in response to the crisis event. 
d. General Model Parameters 
Each object in the figure has a number of model parameters that are set to 
guide the behavior of the agent-based model (Looney & Nissen 2006).  These parameter 
settings reflect empirical observations from the immersive fieldwork phase, empirically 
determined “normal” levels for organizations in general (see Jin & Levitt 1996; Levitt et 
al. 1999; Nissen & Levitt 2004), or draw on prior related research (see Wong & Burton 
2001; Looney & Nissen 2006).  Table 8 summarizes the baseline model’s parameters.  
The following brief description of the model parameters is drawn from the SimVision 
User Guide.   
The first three parameters represent the organization design specifications.  
Centralization describes the degree to which communication flows and decision making 
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are hierarchical.  In the baseline model, centralization is set to “medium” to reflect the 
interorganizational alliance nature of the case: although one of the “Plan Mgrs” is 
designated to lead the collaborative planning project, each organization represents an 
independent maritime organization and will not defer exclusively to the lead manager.  
Formalization describes the degree to which communication flows and work tasks follow 
formal routines and documented standardized procedures.  This parameter is set to “low” 
to reflect the propensity of highly experienced planners to not rigidly follow the defined 
steps of their planning process and do their best to equally respond to both formal and 
informal communications.  Matrix strength represents the degree that managers supervise 
subordinates and are relied upon to handle exception situations that occur during tasks.  
This parameter is set to “medium” to reflect the combined nature of some designated 
supervision along with the necessary informal communication that take place during 
interorganizational coordination activities.   
The next four parameters reflect probabilities for communications, noise, 
functional exceptions (FE), and project exceptions (PE).  The intensity of 
communications and the frequency of interruptions (e.g., misunderstanding in what was 
communicated) are governed by the communications and noise probability settings.  In 
this model of virtual interorganizational collaboration, these parameter settings, 0.7 and 
0.5 respectively, are guided by Wong and Burton (2001) and supported by the empirical 
observations of this case study.  Likewise, the FE and PE settings of 0.05 and 0.1 
respectively are guided by Looney and Nissen (2006) and supported by the empirical 
observations of this case study.  FE represents the probability that an exception occurs in 
a task, and that the exception will only affect the quality of that task.  PE represents the 
probability that an exception occurs in a task, and that the exception will affect any 
related tasks (i.e., tasks connected by red rework links). 
The next three parameters reflect the experience and knowledge available 
in the project.  Team experience reflects the experience level of all the actors facing the 
problem at hand (i.e., the project).  Both the unique nature of crisis events and the 
interorganizational collaborative planning situation drive this parameter setting to “low.”  
Planning skill and application experience are parameters associated with each actor.  
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Planning skill accounts for the competency of the actor at performing the planning tasks 
of the project.  In this case, the “Plan Mgrs” and “OPTs” are determined to have a “high” 
level of planning skill.  The “Cdr” position is responsible for general decision making 
and review tasks, hence, the default “generic” skill setting of “medium” is applied.  The 
application experience setting is “high” for the “OPTs,” since they were generally 
shielded from direct communications with other MOCs and their tasks remained 
grounded in their standard planning process.  For the “Cdrs” and the “Plan Mgrs,” the 
application experience is set to “low;” this accounts for the unfamiliar work of virtual 
simultaneous interorganizational collaboration coupled with the unfamiliar concept of co-
equal military organizations must coordinating operations without the  typical military 
hierarchy in place providing strict unity of command. 
Finally, the actors in each organization are arranged in a familiar three 
level hierarchal configuration.  The “Cdr” is designate a project manager, the “Plan Mgr” 
is designated a subteam leader and the “OPT” is designated as a subteam.  These settings 
affect the speed and type of exception handling that occurs in the project.  “Project 
managers” tend to handle exceptions quickly and thoroughly, while “subteam” actors 
take longer to decide and tend to ignore or only partially handle exceptions.  The unique 
aspect of this baseline model is that the commanders are not connected directly to their 
subordinates as is the case in typical hierarchical organizations.  The POW-ER model as 
currently designed allows for only one supervisor per actor; therefore, to create the 
situation where one “Plan Mgr” is designated to lead the collaborative planning effort, the 
other “Plan Mgrs” have the lead “Plan Mgr” as their supervisor.  That precludes the 
ability to connect the non-designated “Plan Mgrs” to their respective “Cdr.”  
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Table 8. Baseline POW-ER Model Parameter Settings 
e. Baseline Performance Results 
The POW-ER modeling environment is used to emulate the behavior and 
performance of the baseline model just described.  The baseline model as described 
above meets the requirements for face validity based on reviews by an observation team 
member, planning experts, and organizational modeling experts.  The following 
performance results are presented to demonstrate that the baseline model corresponds to 
the behaviors and performance of the observed organization in the field.  With that 
element of external validity, there is confidence that this model is suitable for developing 
and running computational experiments for hypothesis testing. 
Table 9 summarizes the observed performance of all the groups, the 
targeted run time for each major task, the simulated run time for each major task, and the 
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critical path method (CPM) setting for each major task.  All numbers represent hours to 
complete a task.  The asterisked columns constitute the primary input for the task 
duration specifications of the baseline model since the MOCs grouped together in these 
vignettes clearly represented the tacit knowledge group (i.e., cohesive teams of 
experienced planners).  The “Target” column generally averages the observed durations 
in the two asterisked columns.  The shaded column represents performance outputs of the 
Monte Carlo simulations for the baseline model.  The performance outputs in the “Run 
Time” column are based on the mean of 30 cases conducted with unique seed values (i.e., 
1-30) and a total of 50 trials per case.  Finally, the “CPM Duration” column lists the hour 
value assigned to the “effort” parameter of each task.  The “effort” parameter reflects 
only the direct work associated with a task: this is how long a task would take to 
accomplish in a perfect situation such as where no exceptions or communications were 
required during the performance of the task. 
The “Run Time” quantities correspond well to the observed task durations 
in the “Target” column.  At this point, the baseline model has achieved both face validity 
and internal validity based on the accepted structure depicted in Figure 13, and the 
performance of the model listed in Table 9.  With these two conditions and the strong 
construct validity of associated with Stanford’s years of Virtual Design Team research, 
there is substantial confidence that the baseline computational model can be used to 
support the computational experimentation necessary to answer the research question 




Table 9. Baseline POW-ER Model Output Details 
2. Model Manipulations for Computational Experimentation 
Using the baseline model described above, manipulations informed by theory and 
field observations were made to create three new models to generate data for each of the 
three remaining cells in the two factorial experiment design—coordination mechanism 
and knowledge type.  The parameters for these models are listed in Table 10.  The 
parameter settings for the baseline direct supervision-tacit knowledge (DS-TK) are listed 
in the second column and have been explained in the previous section.  The last three 
columns present the modification to the baseline model in bold font, and the column 
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heading underscores the treatment modification from the baseline—i.e., direct 
supervision-explicit knowledge (DS-EK), mutual adjustment-tacit knowledge (MA-TK), 
and mutual adjustment-explicit knowledge (MA-EK). 
a. Explicit Knowledge Manipulation 
The third column, DS-EK has the same hierarchical structure and tasks as 
the baseline model.  In other words, a screen capture of this DS-EK model is identical to 
the baseline model, DS-TK (see Figure 14 above).  All of the manipulations to create the 
DS-EK model are made to the model parameter settings.  The first parameter 
manipulation to create differentiation between groups on the condition of knowledge 
type, tacit versus explicit, is the formalization parameter.  This parameter governs the 
communications flows between all tasks.  A formalization setting of “low” (see baseline 
settings for DS-TK) indicates that the actors are less likely to follow the formal process 
steps of a task, and engage in more informal task-related communications while 
performing the each task.  Multiple field observations support this setting; observers at 
MOC5 and MOC6 both noted that the cohesive teams of highly experienced planners 
preferred to move quickly and flexibly through the process steps—appearing to operate 
“almost instinctively.”  Observers at MOC3 noted that the “OPT” closely but flexibly 
performed tasks—treating the doctrinal process as a guide rather than a prescriptive 
process to be exactingly adhered to.  Hence, the setting to create the EK condition alters 
the baseline’s formalization setting of “low” to “medium.”  This modification is further 
supported by field observations and interviews.  At MOC1, it was noted that the “OPT” 
members were given a template for the planning products that they were responsible for 
completing.  The planners generally stepped through each section of the template in 
order.  A “Plan Manager” of a less experienced “OPT” was observed to have a deep 
conviction about being deliberate in reviewing each detail of a product in the doctrinally 
prescribed order.  His discussion of these products in collaboration sessions was also 
deliberate and time consuming.  Although this strict following of prescribed procedures 
may seem highly formal, the informal communications that occur between “Plan Mgrs” 
during review and coordination tasks in this virtual team interorganizational system 
precludes the formalization parameter being set to “high.” 
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The settings of application experience and skill level are the remaining 
two parameters that help instantiate the EK condition.  Knowledge flow theory describes 
tacit knowledge as highly personal know-how acquired largely by the experience of 
performing actions—e.g., on the job training and apprenticeship.  A team of people that 
have very little experience in performing the steps of the doctrine, especially in the fast-
paced instance of planning in response to a crisis, are deemed to have a parameter setting 
of “low” for application experience.  Furthermore, maritime headquarters’ planning 
familiarization events generally focus on planning for conventional military combat 
operations as opposed to disaster response operations. 
The most obvious difference between a TK and EK condition regards the 
skill level.  Knowledge flow theory clearly considers people with a high degree of tacit 
knowledge to be highly skilled—hence, the “OPTs” of the TK condition and all “Plan 
Mgrs” have a planning skill level set to “high.”  For the EK condition, the “OPTs” are 
supplied with written doctrine and planning product templates, and generally have some 




Table 10. POW-ER Model Manipulations for Experimentation 
b. Mutual Adjustment Manipulation 
A direct supervision coordination mechanism is characterized by 
centralized decision making (e.g., exception handling).  Were the baseline model to 
represent an intra-organizational system, the centralization parameter would likely have 
been set to “high,” but in this interorganizational case, it is set to “medium.”  The mutual 
adjustment coordination mechanism has a centralization setting of “low” to reflect the 
idea that each MOC is independent and does not look to any centralized decision maker.  
Each “Plan Manager” makes his or her own decisions regarding their MOC’s plans. 
Matrix strength is the other parameter that helps instantiate the mutual 
adjustment condition.  The mutual adjustment condition supports the idea that actors in 
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an organization or between organizations in an interorganizational system are highly 
connected and, hence, have a greater propensity to informally communicate amongst one 
another.  The matrix strength parameter is changed to “high” in the case where a mutual 
adjustment coordination mechanism is present.  But that is not enough to fully capture in 
the POW-ER model the activities of an interorganizational system operating by a mutual 
adjustment coordination mechanism: structural, process and communications entities 
need to be addressed; hence, the visual display of the baseline model is changed to fully 
instantiate the mutual adjustment condition. 
The first difference to discuss is the hierarchical relationship amongst the 
actors presented in the baseline model (see Figure 14 above).  Figure 15 shows that no 
single “Plan Mgr” has a supervisory link to another “Plan Mgr.”  In other words, the 
MOCs do not have any hierarchical coordination mechanism present.  The next change to 
note is that the tasks that the “OPTs” perform are now linked by green communication 
links.  These links show that the actors conducting these tasks communicate regarding the 
interdependencies of elements within the tasks.  For example, during a mission analysis 




Figure 15.   POW-ER Model of Mutual Adjustment Coordination Mechanism for 
Collaborative Interorganization Planning Coordination Using Mutual Adjustment 
Coordination Mechanism in a Virtual Environment Model  
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Regarding the “Plan Managers,” no longer would they need to perform the 
two separate tasks of Plan Preparation (Plan Prep scheduled for two hours with no green 
communication links) and Planning Coordination (Plan Coord scheduled for 15 minutes 
with communication links) depicted in the baseline model.  The details collaborated on 
during the Planning Coordination task could be developed during a collaborative Plan 
Preparation task.  Instead of the direct supervision models’ two task parallel sequence, 
the mutual adjustment condition allows for the Plan Preparation and Planning 
Coordination tasks to be combined into one Plan Preparation task (scheduled for two 
hours) with green communication links connecting each MOC’s similarly named task.  
Of note, the green communication links add time to the simulated duration of each task, 
so deleting the 15 minutes of collaborative communications between the baseline model’s 
Planning Coordination is accounted for in the communications growth and concomitant 
growth in simulation duration of the Plan Preparation task. 
The milestone markers in the baseline are set as single entities.  This is 
because the coordination meetings are supervised by the lead “Plan Manager.”  In other 
words, the task Mission Analysis Coordination (MA Coord depicted in the baseline 
model) cannot begin until everyone is ready (i.e., finished their predecessor tasks.  In the 
mutual adjustment model, the milestones are represented by three independent boxes, as 
MOCs can theoretically proceed at their own pace.  The only difference to this 
generalization occurs prior to the COA Analysis task.  The nature of the COA Analysis 
step is to synchronize all functional areas relevant to the mission at hand.  Disjointed (i.e., 
tasks not conducted at the same time) work on this plan synchronization task would likely 
be less productive than simultaneous completion of this synchronization task.  In light of 
this, a single milestone precedes the three COA Analysis tasks that are now connected by 
green communication links in the mutual adjustment models.   
The final difference between the direct supervision and mutual adjustment 
conditions is the parameters of the coordination tasks (e.g., MA Coord and COA Coord 
depicted in the baseline model).  In the direct supervision condition, the “OPTs” do not 
collaborate during their tasks.  All collaboration between the MOCs is handled by “Plan 
Managers.”  This puts the entire coordination burden on them.  The collaboration is 
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conducted entirely during the coordination tasks.  To account for the large amount of 
detail that has to be covered and the sole responsibility to accomplish this coordination 
falls to the “Plan Managers,” the requirement complexity and solution complexity 
parameters of the “Plan Manager’s” MA Coord and Plan Coord tasks are set to “high” in 
the direct supervision models.  Because the OPTs in the mutual adjustment conditions 
informally communicate during the major development tasks of each phase, it is assumed 
that less detail review and coordination challenges will be faced by the “Plan Managers” 
during the coordination tasks.  To instantiate this assumption, the requirement complexity 
and solution complexity parameters of the “Plan Manager’s” coordination tasks (depicted 
as MA Review and COA Review in the mutual adjustment models) are both set to 
“medium” in the mutual adjustment models.  Additionally, the duration setting of these 
tasks is also likely to be less due to the need to only address those issues that could not be 
resolved during the collaborations performed by the “OPTs.”  In light of this, 30 minutes 
is decremented from the post-MA Internal and post-COA Dev Internal milestone review 
tasks (formerly Coord task depicted in the baseline model) of the mutual adjustment 
condition. 
C. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
1. Characteristics of the Dependent Variables  
Each of the four models is run 30 times using a seed value sequenced from 1 to 30 
to initialize the Monte Carlo simulations.  Each time a model is run, a total of 50 trials for 
that seed value are conducted.  The dependent variables of speed, functional risk and 
project risk are checked to ascertain that they meet the assumptions for performing 
parametric statistical analysis techniques (e.g., ANOVA) so that there is confidence in the 
reliability of the results (Kerlinger & Lee 2000; Field 2005).  Normality and 
homoscedasticity are the assumptions for parametric techniques and they are checked for 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality and Levene’s test for homoscedasticity 
(Field 2005).  Over the entire data set (120 runs), the dependent variable of speed ranges 
from 22.85 to 37.30 hours (m = 29.73, s = 5.61).  Functional risk ranged from 0.2401  
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to 0.4729 (m = 0.3434, s = 0.0543), project risk ranges from 0.2866 to 0.5551 (m = 
0.4452, s = 0.0466), and communication risk from 0.4221 to 0.5515 (m = 0.4951, s = 
0.0373).  Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality, each dependent variable is 
determined (p < 0.05) to come from a normal distribution, as shown in Table 11.  Using 
Levene’s Test for equality of variance, most of the dependent variables are determined (p 
< 0.05) to meet the homoscedasticity assumption as shown in Table 12.  The dependent 
variable of speed has an F-statistic of 3.859 which corresponds to a 0.011 level of 
significance that does not meet the p < 0.05 test; however, “In terms of violations of the 
assumptions of homogeneity of variance, ANOVA is fairly robust when sample sizes are 
equal.” (Field 2005 p. 324)  Since the majority of the parametric technique assumptions 
are met and for the one exception, it has been shown that the ANOVA is robust when 
sample sizes are equal as in this computational experiment, the parametric ANOVA 
technique is applicable as the basis for this analysis of the data. 
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Table 11. Test for Normality 
 
Table 12. Test for Homoscedasticity  
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a. Speed 
The first hypothesis test regards the speed that it takes for the project to be 
completed.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that knowledge types interacting with coordination 
mechanisms will have a statistically significant impact on the speed at which a virtual 
team completes the project.  The ANOVA test finds significant main effects at p < 0.05 
for both the knowledge type (F(1, 116) = 93518.575, p < 0.001, w2 = 0.922) and the 
coordination mechanism (F(1, 116) = 7502.847, p < 0.001, w2 = 0.074).  There is also an 
interaction effect between coordination mechanism and knowledge type (F(1, 116) = 
201.483, p < 0.001, w2 = 0.002)—see Table 13.  Figure 16 graphically shows the 
relationship between the dependent variable of speed and the four conditions of the 2-
factorial design. 
 
Table 13. Tests Between-subjects Effects on the Dependent Variable: Speed. 
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Figure 16.   Plot of ANOVA Test for Speed of Project Completion 
Based on the results of the Factorial ANOVA test, an independent t-test is 
conducted to evaluate hypothesis 1a which predicts that teams made up of individuals 
with high tacit knowledge working under a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism 
will perform their tasks in the shortest amount of time (Mma-tk = 23.09, SE = 0.0247 
compared to Mds-tk = 25.63, SE = 0.0352)—see Table 14 for details of the t-test.  The 
effect size (w2 = 0.919) for the ANOVA and the effect size (r = 0.99) shows that the 
knowledge type has a very large affect on the speed at which project completion is 
achieved (Frey 2006).8  As is common with very large effect sizes, this result is not 
surprising: a group made up of highly experienced teams will in general solve difficult 
problems more rapidly than a group of lesser experienced teams.  Based on the t-test and 
large effects size, the mutual adjustment coordination mechanism appears to be the best 
fit for virtual teams to quickly complete planning problems for crisis events.   
Based on the ANOVA F-test, the effect size (w2 = 0.074) for the main 
effect coordination mechanism does not quite meet Frey’s (2006) threshold for a medium 
affect on the speed of project completion.  This small effect size leads to the conclusion 
                                                 
8 Frey (2006) lays out effect size standards as: small = 0.01, medium = 0.09 and large = 0.25. 
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that managers should consider the differences in performance of the mutual adjustment 
coordination mechanism and the direct supervision coordination mechanism—i.e., that in 
an interorganizational collaboration among groups of boundary spanners, the mutual 
adjustment coordination mechanism will likely  speed up the completion of initial 
planning activities. 
 
Table 14. Results of t-test for DS-TK and MA-TK Conditions  
for Speed of Project Completion 
Finally, while the interaction effect does not occur by chance (i.e., the 
coordination mechanism interacting with knowledge type was statistically significant 
with p < 0.001), the effect size (w2 = 0.002) is so small that managers should be foremost 
concerned with knowledge type and coordination mechanism independently.  There is not 
much value to considering the interaction effect of those independent variables when it 
comes to considering the speed at which the project will be completed.  
b. Functional Risk 
Hypothesis 2 considers the effects on functional risk from the different 
coordination mechanisms and knowledge types.  The ANOVA results find significant 
main effects at p < 0.05 for knowledge type (F(1, 116) = 231.671, p < 0.001, w2 = 0.667); 
however, there is a non-significant main effect for the coordination mechanism (F(1, 116) 
= 1.305, p = 0.256, w2 < 0.001)—see Table 15.  The interaction effect between 
coordination mechanism and knowledge type is also not significant (F(1, 116) = 1.149, p 
= 0.286, w2 = 0.001).  
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Table 15. Tests Between-subjects Effects on the Dependent Variable: Functional 
Risk 
The ANOVA results do not support hypothesis 2a.  Individuals with high 
tacit knowledge operating under the mutual adjustment coordination mechanism (mma-tk = 
.2996, s = 0.0313) do not perform statistically different from individuals with high tacit 
knowledge operating under a direct supervision coordination mechanism (mds-tk = .2992, s 
= 0.0306).  There is no statistically significant difference between levels of functional 
risk where teams of individuals with high explicit knowledge operate under either 
coordination mechanism (mds-ek = .3810, s = 0.0340, compared to mma-ek = .3938, s = 
0.0306).  Figure 17 shows the relationship between the dependent variable of functional 
risk and the four conditions of the 2-factorial design.   
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Figure 17.   Plot of ANOVA Results for Functional Risk 
c. Project Risk 
Hypothesis 3 considers the effects on project risk from the different 
coordination mechanisms and knowledge types.  The ANOVA results find significant 
main effects at p < 0.05 for knowledge type (F(1, 116) = 28.262, p < 0.001, w2 < 0.165).  
There is a non-significant main effect based on coordination mechanism (F(1, 116) = 
2.733, p = 0.101, w2 < 0.012), and a non-significant interaction effect between 
coordination mechanism and knowledge type (F(1, 116) = 1.129, p = 0.290, w2 < 




Table 16. Tests Between-subjects Effects on the Dependent Variable:  
Project Risk 
The ANOVA results do not support hypothesis 3a as there is no 
statistically significant project risk performance difference between the tacit knowledge 
teams operating under the different coordination mechanisms (mds-tk = .4353, s = 0.0413 
and mma-tk = .4145, s = 0.0526).  This also applies to the explicit knowledge teams (mds-ek 
= .4677, s=0.0318 compared to mma-ek = .4632, s = 0.0387).  Regarding knowledge type 
as a contingency factor, the effect size (w2 = 0.165) for this finding is moderate, and leads 
to the assessment that there is a moderately strong relationship between the independent 
variable knowledge type and the dependent variable project risk.  Regarding the 
relationship between coordination mechanism and project risk, the results do not reveal 
statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level; however, the results are close and the effect 
size is small.  Since the number of trials in this ANOVA was determined by a power 
calculation based on detecting a large effect size, perhaps future research should look at 
this effect being of a moderate size.  That would lead to more trials being conducted for 
this relationship and perhaps a finding of statistical significance (i.e., conducting this 
ANOVA with 80 runs may detect a statistically significant difference for coordination 
mechanism).  Figure 18 shows a graphical representation of the relationships.  
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Figure 18.   Plot of ANOVA Results for Project Risk 
d. Communication Risk 
Hypothesis 4 considers the effects on communication risk from the 
different coordination mechanisms and knowledge types.  The results of testing the 
variable communication risk show interesting results.  The factorial ANOVA test finds 
significant main effects at p < 0.001 for both the knowledge type (F(1, 116) = 167.803, p 
< 0.001, w2 = 0.093 and the coordination mechanism (F(1, 116) = 67.218, p < 0.001, w2 = 
0.071))—see Table 17.  The interaction effect between coordination mechanism and 
knowledge type is also significant (F(1, 116) = 1352.039, p < 0.001, w2 = 0.786). 
 
Table 17. Tests Between-Subjects Effects on the Dependent Variable: 
Communication Risk 
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The ANOVA results show that teams made up of individuals with high 
tacit knowledge working under a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism have the 
lowest amount of communications risk (m = 0.4430, s = 0.0098).  Teams made up of 
individuals with high tacit knowledge working under a direct supervision coordination 
method seem to have a significant problem regarding some aspect of communications as 
they perform significantly worse than individuals with high explicit knowledge operating 
under the direct supervision coordination mechanism (mds-tk = 0.5239, s = 0.0094, 
compared to mds-ek = 0.4810, s = 0.0092).   
Figure 19 shows the relationship between the dependent variable of 
communication risk and the four conditions of the 2-factorial design.  That representation 
points towards some fit problem between direct supervision and high tacit knowledge.  
The large interaction effect size (w2 = 0.786), moderate effect size (w2 = 0.093) for 
knowledge type, and small effect size (w2 = 0.071) for coordination mechanism point to 
the importance of these relationships for consideration by managers.   
 
 
Figure 19.   Plot of ANOVA Results for Communication Risk 
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A t-test is used to evaluate hypothesis 4a.  Based on the ANOVA results, 
the t-test compares the direct supervision-explicit knowledge (DS-EK) condition to the 
mutual adjustment-tacit knowledge condition (MA-TK).  The results show a statistically 
significant difference at p < 0.05 for communication risk between these two conditions 
(t(58) = -15.528, p < 0.001, effect size r = 0.90).  This confirms the relationship stated 
previously that the mutual adjustment-tacit knowledge condition produces the least 
communication risk (Mma-tk = .4430, SE = .0018 compared to Mds-ek = .4810, SE = .0017).  
Table 18 provides details of the t-test results.  
 
 
Table 18. Results of One-way ANOVA for the DS-EK and MA-TK Conditions for 
Communication Risk 
D. SUMMARY  
This chapter presents the empirical research used to ground a baseline 
computational organizational model of an interorganizational system working within the 
context of a developing complex international crisis event.  While the organizations 
represented in the model are mostly non-homogeneous with respect to the larger national-
level organizations within which they fit (i.e., a MOC represents a middle-line level 
entity of a nation’s military organizational structure), they are relatively homogeneous 
with respect to the processes that they perform (e.g., manage the operations of the full 
panoply of capabilities of maritime assets).  The baseline model, built using a well-
validated computational organization design modeling tool, represents clear patterns of 
similar tasks performed by similarly organized planning teams.  Simulation runs of the 
baseline model produce performance results (e.g., simulation duration output measures) 
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that correspond well with the observed interorganizational phenomenon; hence, there is 
confidence in the validity of the model and its use in computational experimentation. 
The baseline model represents one of the four required models necessary to 
conduct the experimental runs in this two factorial ANOVA hypothesis testing research 
design.  Theory driven structural and design parameter changes were made to the baseline 
model which represents the direct supervision-tacit knowledge (DS-TK) condition.  The 
three other models represent the remaining conditions in the two factorial research design 
(i.e., direct supervision-explicit knowledge (DS-EK), mutual adjustment-tacit knowledge 
(MA-TK), and mutual adjustment-explicit knowledge (MA-EK)).  Table 19 presents a 
summary of the results of the hypotheses tested. 
 
Table 19. Summary of Performance Results 
The results point to the conclusion that where independent teams of individuals 
that possess a high level of tacit knowledge (e.g., a combination of in depth knowledge 
and experience) collaborate over virtual tools (e.g., virtual meeting applications) on a 
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project, then a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism is a good fit for achieving 
high performance across the dimensions of speed, functional risk (i.e., component 
quality), project risk (i.e., project integration quality), and communication risk (i.e., the 
ratio of missed or mishandled communication among actor to number of attempted 
communication exchanges).  Across all variables except communication risk, teams that 
possess a high level of tacit knowledge outperform teams comprised of individuals that 
only possess explicit knowledge (e.g., written procedures).  For the management 
personnel and organization decision makers that enter into an interorganizational 
relationship using virtual collaborations technologies during the early stages of a crisis, 
assembling the most knowledgeable and experienced personnel available should be 
encouraged.  If that can be achieved, then a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism 
is likely to be the best fit to achieve high performance.   
 
 114
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 115
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes the research method and then presents the contributions 
and limitations of this research.  It concludes with suggestions for further research and a 
summary of the findings. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHOD 
This dissertation is an example of mixed-method research, where immersive 
qualitative research informs computational modeling for quantitative hypothesis testing 
experiments.  It explores organization design issues at the interorganization level of 
analysis using a structural contingency theory lens combined with computational 
organizational theory and agent-based computational modeling predicated on information 
processing theory.  At issue are the possible contingency effects of knowledge type (i.e., 
tacit and explicit) interacting with coordination mechanisms (i.e., direct supervision and 
mutual adjustment) in the activities of boundary spanning teams from multiple 
interdependent but structurally independent (i.e., no shared formal lines of authority or 
contracts) organizations.  This phenomenon sometimes occurs during the early stages of a 
crisis event (e.g., natural disasters) where multiple organizations respond and find that 
they are reciprocally interdependent.  Due to the complex and turbulent situations that 
abound in disaster events, organizations find themselves sharing knowledge, resources 
and capabilities to help achieve some relatively common goals. 
Structural contingency theory has much to offer managers and organization 
leaders regarding which coordination mechanisms are fit with environmental conditions 
and task interdependencies.  These insights are generally applicable at the organizational 
level, but little is known about how they apply at the interorganizational level.  This 
research explores this area by investigating the activities of a certain set of boundary 
spanners (e.g., planning teams) as they perform their typical intra-organizational work 




coordination tasks (e.g., coordinating planning activities and coordinating operations 
plans).  In this research, the unit of analysis is the team of planners at a maritime 
headquarters. 
Immersive qualitative field research was conducted at six maritime headquarters 
(i.e., four national fleet headquarters representing three different countries, and two 
multinational headquarters) located in four different countries.  Six teams of participant 
observers each observed a planning team from the participating headquarters as those 
planners attempted to perform planning tasks while collaborating with two other planning 
teams, each from another headquarters.  Since none of the maritime headquarters were 
co-located, these interorganizational collaborations represented a virtual team 
phenomenon (Clancy 1994; Lipnack & Stamps 1997; Wong & Burton 2001).  In essence, 
each maritime headquarters was co-equal in this interorganizational system, and in 
general, they shared common goals regarding responding to a crisis event.  All 
interactions took place simultaneously during a major maritime multinational field 
exercise where the crisis was synthetic—i.e., hypothetical events were disclosed to the 
participants through pre-designed scripts and dynamic scenario injects (e.g., a team of 
expert exercise controllers fielded information requests and orders emanating from the 
planning teams and provided feedback as deemed appropriate).  
At each maritime headquarters, there was a team of participant observers that 
collected archival data, documented the planning and collaboration processes performed 
and conducted open-ended interviews of select participants to ensure that the process and 
knowledge flows were documented.  This qualitative research phase led to the 
development of a baseline computational organizational model that represented a 
generalized model of the observed phenomena.  Once the baseline model was validated, 
select design parameters of that baseline model were modified to create new models for 
use in hypothesis testing computational experiments.  Those modifications are grounded 
in organization design and knowledge flow theories.   
The POW-ER agent-based modeling tool is used to create all of the models and 
run Monte Carlo simulations to generate the data necessary to test the hypotheses 
articulated in Chapter II.  The hypotheses are tested predominately using parametric 
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analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical techniques.  The results of those tests are 
presented in Chapter IV and a summary is provided in Chapter V.B.2—see Table 20. 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation contributes to knowledge in the field of organization research in 
two main ways.  The first broad area of contribution regards facilitating the inquiry of 
fleeting interorganizational phenomena.  Such phenomena often exist during the early 
phases of disaster response operations.  The other broad area of contribution is made in 
the field of organization design, specifically structural contingency theory where support 
is found for knowledge type (i.e., tacit and explicit) being a relevant structural 
contingency factor.  Summary details of these two contributions follow. 
1. Exploring Fleeting Interorganizational Phenomena 
As interorganizational systems become more prevalent in the world, and 
knowledge flows are recognized as highly valuable to organizations, it is natural that 
more research into the intersection of knowledge flows and interorganizational systems 
will emerge.  This research demonstrates one way to explore the organizational design 
space for interorganizational systems, and compare important interactions of traditionally 
recognized coordination mechanisms and important knowledge dynamics. 
Computational organization theory has set the stage for the development of 
powerful tools to support organization design research.  This research has operationalized 
a mixed method research approach to explore a relevant, fleeting interorganizational 
phenomenon—i.e., coordination among an interorganizational system in a disaster 
environment.  Grounded in an objective, positivistic perspective, the qualitative phase 
captures work processes, structural coordination mechanisms, and knowledge flows of a 
virtual team in order to inform the creation of a baseline agent-based computational 
organization model.  Once this baseline model has been validated (e.g., checked for 
internal and face validity), computational experiments can be conducted by modifying 
select elements (e.g., design parameters and organization structures) of this baseline 
model to create distinct executable agent-based models of other observed or envisioned 
organizations.  Using Monte Carlo simulation techniques, these agent-based organization 
 118
models can produce comparable performance results.  Hence, this research enables the 
exploration of complex and fleeting interorganization phenomena. 
2. Extending Structural Contingency Theory 
Structural contingency theory is generally used to explain organization 
performance based upon recognized structural organization design variables interacting 
with relevant contingency factors.  This research extends the traditional focus of 
structural contingency theory—i.e., the exploration of organizational phenomena, to the 
important and relevant activity of exploring design issues that potentially affect 
performance of interorganizational systems. 
In this research, the fit of traditional structural design coordination mechanisms 
(i.e., direct supervision and mutual adjustment) interacting with different knowledge 
types (i.e., tacit and explicit) is explored at the interorganizational level of analysis.  
While there are many other relevant units of analysis to use to explore this 
interorganizational phenomena, this research focuses on a specific boundary spanning 
team (Mintzberg 1979; Callahan & Salipante 1979) of multiple interacting organizations.  
That boundary spanning team in this research is the planning team.  The statistical 
analysis, summarized in Table 20 clearly shows some relevant performance effects of 
those interactions.  This new knowledge is important to managers when 




Table 20. Performance Summary of 2-Factorial Experiment 
This research looks into a relevant condition where virtual teams of military 
personnel from different organizations collaborate to achieve coordination without 
having to experience the significant organizational changes that come with detaching 
from their organization and physically moving to work at a newly formed multinational 
headquarters.  In general, that multinational headquarters formation process takes travel 
time, time to learn new applications and procedures, and removes people from direct and 
familiar means to interface with their parent organization’s knowledge network.  Time is 
generally not a luxury available in crisis response operations.  Networking technologies 
and information processing applications point to potential interorganizational system 
performance implications of virtual teams (Wong & Burton 2001). 
This research finds that there are different effects on interorganizational 
performance metrics (i.e., speed of project completion, functional risk associated with 
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process step completion, overall project risk, and communications risk) based on the 
interaction of different coordination mechanisms (i.e., direct supervision and mutual 
adjustment) and different knowledge types (i.e., tacit and explicit).  Hence, managers and 
organization leaders faced with reciprocal interdependencies with other organizations 
should apprise themselves of the knowledge types available to perform 
interorganizational collaboration work, especially if that work may be performed in the 
context of virtual teams: knowledge type has a contingent effect on interorganizational 
performance based on the fit of different coordination mechanisms.   
This research shows that a mutual adjustment coordination mechanism is most fit 
(i.e., mutual adjustment outperforms direct supervision in all cases except function risk 
where there is no statistically significant difference between the two) when teams are 
made up of people with a high level of tacit knowledge applicable to the task at hand.  
Hence, the efficacy of mutual adjustment coordination mechanisms in interorganizational 
virtual team collaborations among experts is fairly conclusive. 
Of note, the result of testing communications risk shows an interesting interaction 
effect—see Figure 20.  During a crisis or disaster response situation, managers may not 
have a high degree of control over the availability of expertise (e.g., generalist or 
specialist) and experience from within their organization.  As task uncertainty increases, 
agility is postulated as an important organizational characteristic (Postrel 2002; 
Mowshowitz 2002; Alberts & Hayes 2003).  Agility connotes movement: the ability to 
modify or change.  Developing virtual teams may be a viable option for enhancing the 
ability to attain goals, especially in crisis or disaster response situations where 
organizational goals are often generally similar.  This research shows that the knowledge 
type available has an effect on different performance measures.  Hence, manager and 
leaders should consider not only the efficacy of virtual teams, but also which 
coordination mechanism is fit with the type of knowledge (e.g., tacit or explicit) prevalent 





Figure 20.   Plot of ANOVA Results for Communication Risk 
This research provides insight into the ongoing debate regarding the three 
competing theoretic perspectives about effective ways to achieve coordinated actions 
among an interorganizational system responding to a disaster.  The debate involves 1) the 
emergent coordinating group (e.g., see Dynes & Quarantelli 1968; Dynes 1978; Kreps 
1978; Perrow 1984; Drabek 1986; Harrald et al. 1994), 2) the centralized system (e.g., 
see Meyer & Rowan 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Staw et al. 1981; DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983), and 3) the distributed system (e.g., Dynes & Quarantelli 1968; Lawrence 
& Lorsch 1969; Galbraith 1973; Malone 1987; Comfort 1994; Harrald et al. 1994). 
The emergent coordinating group perspective predicts that groups of 
organizations will “spontaneously coalesce during a crisis to help manage the 
interdependencies of individual responding organizations and to reduce conflict.” 
(Topper & Carley 1999 p. 69)  The participants in this coordination group may have little 
experience or authority to perform the required tasks.  In large-scale disasters that require 
extensive resources, the mutual adjustment coordination mechanism appears to be only 
“accidentally effective.” (Wright 1976 p. 82)  The general trend to the development over 
time of the emergent coordinating group is to start with mostly disconnected 
organizations and a few pre-planned coordination structures operating.  This is followed 
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by a phase of self-organizing behavior where new coordination structures between pairs 
of organizations emerge.  Furthermore, for coordination by mutual adjustment to emerge, 
it seems to require a lack of available coordination expertise (Wright 1976).  
The centralized system looks to a single organization to assume the dominate 
coordination role for the rest of the organizations in its affected area.  This centralized 
coordination method—similar to direct supervision, seeks to capitalize on perceived 
vertical information processing efficiencies and reduction of uncertainty within the 
interorganizational system.  Wright (1976) drew on multiple disaster event case studies 
and identified an apparent contingency theoretic perspective that interorganization 
coordination through centralized control was more likely to be effective in smaller 
disasters where fewer resources were needed, and actors with appropriate coordination 
expertise were available.  This centralized system is very similar to “military style” 
coordination network typically referred to as a command and control organization.  This 
pre-planning and centralized control, however, has been maligned in other prominent 
disaster research studies (see Harrald et al. 1994, Dynes 1998, and Suparamaniam & 
Dekker 2003). 
The distributed system draws on contingency and information processing theories.  
These theories explain that distributed team-like structures respond quickly and 
accurately to the turbulent environment found when responding to a disaster (Carley & 
Lin 1997; Topper & Carley 1999).  Others have corroborated these finding, pointing to 
organizational agility and lateral ties between subsystems being fit with turbulent 
environments (see Krackhardt & Stern 1988; Carley 1992; Harrald et al. 1994; Dekker 
2005).  A key aspect of this interorganizational structural fit is early identification and 
agreement on common goals, and a reliance on coordination through feedback rather than 
coordination via rigid pre-planned responses (Topper & Carley 1999).  By feedback 
mechanisms and informal communications, the structure that produces 
interorganizational coordination is allowed to emerge and become distributed.  As the 
disaster response moves along in time, this interorganizational system is agile enough to 
allow the organizations to effectively begin cooperating with local community entities, 
which is a key performance enhancement finding of Harrald et al. (1994). 
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The preceding sections highlight the debate regarding the effectiveness of 
different coordination mechanisms in achieving high performance in crisis response 
operations where interorganizational systems frequently operate in the face of high 
uncertainty.  It has been shown that knowledge types (e.g., trans-specialist and specialist) 
within an organization produce varying performance results (Nissen et al. 2008).  Again, 
in this dissertation, types of knowledge (i.e., tactic and explicit) interacting with different 
coordination mechanisms (i.e., direct supervision and mutual adjustment) are explored to 
assess their affects on the performance of interorganizational systems that respond to 
disaster event.   
The findings of this research support the idea that where experienced and 
knowledgeable teams are present, a distributed system of self-organizing (i.e., mutual 
adjustment coordination mechanism) boundary spanners will be highly effective.  Where 
experience and skills are not prevalent in the boundary spanning team, the 
communications risk is highest in the self-organizing interorganizational system, thus its 
feedback mechanisms and informal communications may cause performance problems in 
crisis response events.  The effects that different knowledge types have on 
communication risk for a centralized coordination system (i.e., direct supervision), shows 
a different relationship than for that of the distributed system (i.e., mutual adjustment): 
boundary spanning teams that are highly experienced and knowledgeable incur a greater 
communications risk than teams armed with only explicit knowledge.  Those results may 
provide insight as to why hypothesis 3a (i.e., high tacit knowledge combined with direct 
supervision coordination mechanism will performance best with respect to minimizing 
project risk) was not supported.  It is reasonable to conclude, that when operating in a 
virtual team condition, missed formal and informal communications opportunities under 
the direct supervision coordination mechanism adversely impact the ability to achieve 
integration quality among the participating organizations. 
C. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The theoretical underpinning of this research stems from structural contingency 
theory, knowledge flow theory, and information processing theory.  None of these 
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theories specifically address output measures to assess the level of coordination achieved 
in planning projects.  Without an accepted scale for measuring level of coordination 
within and among plans, the level of internal validity of this dissertation’s baseline model 
regarding project risk is slightly degraded.  Research should be conducted to develop a 
reliable scale that assesses the degree of coordination achieved in plans and during 
planning tasks.  That research should also cover the differing types of operation plans that 
organizations develop (e.g., plans for combat operations and disaster relief operations). 
One important social science variable that is available to be directly modeled in 
the POW-ER computational modeling tool used in this research is trust between agents.  
This could have a profound effect on information and knowledge flows in an 
interorganizational system, especially one that is reliant on network communications 
technology.  Perhaps there are organizational performance relationships between the 
types of media (e.g., see media richness theory—Daft & Lengel 1986) and trust.  
Research into these areas to update computational organization modeling tools would be 
most productive.   
The computational modeling environment used in this research models meetings 
based solely on face-to-face information exchanges.  With the advent of other 
synchronous collaborative meeting applications, future research should explore 
information processing and knowledge flow modeling associated with the many different 
ways to conduct meetings (e.g., video teleconference, online meeting applications, and 
telephone conference calls) and the effects of different numbers of participants (e.g., what 
is the difference in component quality or product quality of a physical coordination 
meeting of 50 people and an online meeting 50 people?).  This could lead to enhanced 
ways to explore and make recommendations regarding the organization design space 
based on information technology available or proposed.  Research into developing 
computational modeling elements to account for how knowledge flows occur would be a 
significant enhancement to the current POW-ER modeling capability.   
This research looks at the phenomenon of interorganizational collaboration based 
on the unique case of relatively homogeneous processes and structures among the 
organizations.  To be sure, there are many more complex relationships that need to be 
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explored, such as the interorganizational collaborations between different military service 
headquarters (e.g., Army and Air Force).  Even more complexity is involved when 
considering how military headquarters collaborate and coordinate with other 
governmental agencies (e.g., USAID) and also non-governmental organizations (e.g., 
International Red Cross).  This research is a stepping stone: it demonstrates the beginning 
of a viable path for exploring more complex interorganizational relationships, especially 
those fleeting ones that emerge during times of crisis where no one organization has 
enough resources, especially knowledge, to achieve common goals.   
This example of mixed method research could lead to a campaign of 
experimentation where laboratory experiments could be conducted to further confirm or 
refute the findings of this research.  From that, more robust field events could be 
conducted to inform decision makers regarding organization design issues, especially 
those related to organizational agility in response to dynamic and complex environments. 
D. SUMMARY 
This research sheds light on a relevant and practical gap in the organization 
design literature, specifically at the interorganizational level of analysis.  There is a 
related ongoing debate in the disaster research literature regarding how crisis response 
operations should be managed to effectively achieve coordination among multiple 
responding organizations.  Drawing on structural contingency theory, knowledge flow 
theory, and computational organization design theory, this research developed and tested 
multiple hypotheses that are useful for managers, organization design researchers, and 
disaster responders.  Table 21 provides a concise overview of the hypotheses tested and 
the results.   
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Table 21. Summary of Hypotheses Tested 
As the finding show, there is evidence that performance of virtual teams is 
affected by different knowledge types interacting with different coordination 
mechanisms.  While knowledge clearly has a large or medium effect size on various 
performance parameters, it is interesting to discover that for virtual teams, the 
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coordination mechanism factor did not have a medium or large effect on any performance 
parameter.  There were, however, small effects based on coordination mechanism, and 
one large effect based the interaction of the coordination mechanism and knowledge type 
factors.  This adds to Wong and Burton’s assertion that “...when organizations are 
considering the formation of virtual teams, they should...be aware of the coordination 
complications that typically result in virtual teams.” (Wong & Burton 2000 p. 357)  This 
research points towards the importance of investing highly skilled and experienced 
people in the virtual teams that initiate boundary-spanning activities.  The debate 
regarding which interorganization coordination system to use during a crisis event did not 
consider the idea of virtual teams.  This research points to the efficacy of virtual teams 
and the distributed system concept, especially where high tacit knowledge can be 
invested in the boundary spanning activities of the virtual teams. 
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